존 랭쇼 오스틴

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존 랭쇼 오스틴(J. L. Austin)
출생 1911년 3월 26일(1911-03-26)
영국 영국 랭커스터
사망 1960년 2월 8일 (48세)
영국 영국 옥스퍼드

존 랭쇼 오스틴(John Langshaw "J. L." Austin, 1911. 3.26 – 1960.2.8)은 영국 언어철학자이다. 언어행위이론으로 유명하다.[1]

생애[편집]

건축가 Geoffrey Langshaw Austin (1884–1971)와 Mary Bowes-Wilson (1883–1948) 사이의 둘째 아들로 랭커스터(Lancaster)에서 태어났다. 1922년 온가족이 스코틀랜드(Scotland)로 이주하여, 아버지 오스틴이 세인트 앤드류(St Andrews)의 성 레오날드 학교(St Leonard's School)의 비서(secretary)가 되었다. 오스틴은 쉬류스베리 학교(Shrewsbury School) 및 발리올 대학(Balliol College, Oxford)에서 장학금으로 공부했다. [2]


저서[편집]

How to Do Things With Words[편집]

How to Do Things With Words는 그의 가장 중요한 책이다.[3][4][5]

Philosophical Papers[편집]

오스틴의 페이퍼를 모아 J. O. Urmson와 Geoffrey Warnock이 발행한 것이다. 초판은 10개의 페이퍼를 모은 것이었으나, 2판에서 2개, 3판에서 1개가 더 추가되었다. 형사법 이론에 큰 영향을 미쳤다.

[6]

[7]

[8]


[9]

오스틴이 각주에서 묘사한 그런 구별의 예는 비슷하게 쓰이는 두 단어 "실수로(by mistake)"와 "우연히(by accident)" 간의 차이다. 그는 호기심적인 철학적 도구를 제안했다. 예를 들어, 키 컨셉(key concept)의 이해를 위해 일종의 단어 게임을 사용했는데 단어사전을 포함해 키 컨셉과 관련된 용어 셀렉션을 찾아 그들 간의 의미 설명을 살피는 것이다. 키 컨셉과 관계된 단어들의 "가족 순환(family circle)" 내에서 단어 목록이 반복되기 시작할 때까지 진행한다.


Wittgenstein[편집]

오스틴은 언어철학에서 Ludwig Wittgenstein과 Gilbert Ryle와 유명하다. [10]

참고[편집]

출판물[편집]

저서
논문 기타
  • "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 53 (1953): 227-246.
  • "Other Minds". In Austin, Philosophical Papers, 1961, (eds. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock), Oxford, Oxford University Press, (originally published in 1946).
  • "Performative Utterances", on Austin, Philosophical Papers, 1961, (eds. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • "A Plea for Excuses", in Austin, Philosophical Papers, 1961, (eds. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • "Performative-Constative", in The Philosophy of Language, 1971, (ed. John R. Searle), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 13–22.
  • "Three Ways of Spilling Ink", The Philosophical Review, 75, No.4, (October 1966), pp 427–440.
번역본
  • Otras mentes. In Austin, Ensayos filosóficos. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1975. 87-117.
  • Un alegato en pro de las excusas. In Austin, Ensayos filosóficos. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1975. 169-92.
  • Quand dire c'est faire Éditions du Seuil, Paris. Traduction française de "How to do things with words" par Gilles Lane, 1970.
  • Palabras y acciones: Cómo hacer cosas con palabras. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1971.
  • Cómo hacer cosas con palabras.: Palabras y acciones. Barcelona: Paidós, 1982.
  • Performativo-Constativo. In Gli atti linguistici. Aspetti e problemi di filosofia del linguagio. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1978. 49-60.
  • Ensayos filosóficos. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1975.
  • Quando dire è fare (ed. Antonio Pieretti).Marietti, 1974.
  • Come fare cose con le parole (eds. Carlo Penco & Marina Sbisà). Genova, Marietti, 1987.
  • Kako delovati rečima. Novi Sad, Matica Srpska, 1994.
  • Saggi filosofici (ed. Paolo Leonardi). Milano, Guerini, 1990.
  • Ako niečo robiť slovami. Bratislava, Kalligram, 2004.

함께 보기[편집]

  • Isaiah Berlin et al., ed. Essays on J.L. Austin. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973.
  • Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (1979). New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. The major work by one of Austin's most prominent heirs. Takes ordinary language approaches to issues of skepticism, but also makes those approaches a subject of scrutiny.
  • Fann, K.T., ed.Symposium on J.L. Austin.New York: Humanities Press, 1969.
  • Gustafsson, M. and Sørli, R. "The Philosophy of J. L. Austin".Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.New anthology of philosophical essays on Austin's work.
  • Kirkham, Richard (Reprint edition: 2 March 1995). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.ISBN 0-262-61108-2. Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of Austin's theory of truth.
  • Passmore, John. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, rev. ed. New York: Basic Books, 1966. Chapter 18 includes a perceptive exposition of Austin's philosophical project.
  • Pitcher, George. "Austin: a personal memoir". Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Isaiah Berlin et al. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973.
  • Hilary Putnam. "The Importance of Being Austin: The Need of a 'Second Näivetē'" Lecture Two in The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. In arguing for "naive realism", Putnam invokes Austin's handling of sense-data theories and their reliance on arguments from perceptual illusion in Sense and Sensibilia, which Putnam calls "one of the most unjustly neglected classics of analytics philosophy" (25).
  • John Searle (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Searle's has been the most notable of attempts to extend and adjust Austin's conception of speech acts.
  • John Searle (1979). Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
  • Scott Soames. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume II: The Age of Meaning. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. Contains a large section on ordinary language philosophy, and a chapter on Austin's treatment of skepticism and perception in Sense and Sensibilia.
  • G.J. Warnock "John Langshaw Austin, a biographical sketch". Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed. K.T. Fann. New York: Humanities Press, 1969.
  • Warnock, G.J. "Saturday Mornings". Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Isaiah Berlin et al. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973.
  • Warnock, G. J.J. L. Austin. London: Routledge, 1992.

참조[편집]

  1. Warnock, G.J. "John Langshaw Austin, a biographical sketch". Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed. K.T. Fann. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. p. 3 Prior to Austin, the attention of linguistic and analytic philosophers had been directed almost exclusively to statements, assertions, and propositions — to linguistic acts that (at least in theory) have truth-value. This led to problems when analyzing certain types of statements, for example in determining the truth conditions for such statements as "I promise to do so-and-so." Austin pointed out that we use language to do things as well as to assert things, and that the utterance of a statement like "I promise to do so-and-so" is best understood as doing something — making a promise — rather than making an assertion about anything. Hence the name of one of his best-known works: "How to do Things with Words".
  2. He arrived at Oxford in 1929 to read Literae Humaniores ('Greats'), and in 1931 gained a First in classical moderations and also won the Gaisford Prize for Greek prose. Greats introduced him to serious philosophy and gave him a lifelong interest in Aristotle. In 1933, he got first class honours in his Finals. Hacker, P. M. S. 'Austin, John Langshaw (1911–1960)', in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 online (subscription site), accessed 16 Aug 2008 During World War II Austin served in the British Intelligence Corps, MI6. It has been said of him that, “he more than anybody was responsible for the life-saving accuracy of the D-Day intelligence” (reported in Warnock 1963: 9). Austin left the army with the rank of lieutenant colonel and was honored for his intelligence work with an Order of the British Empire, the French Croix de Guerre, and the U.S. Officer of the Legion of Merit. [1] After the war Austin became White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. He began holding his famous "Austin's Saturday Mornings" where students and colleagues would discuss language usages (and sometimes books on language) over tea and crumpets, but published little. See John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (New York: Basic Books, 1967) 459, n. 2. Austin visited Harvard and Berkeley in the mid-fifties, in 1955 delivering the William James Lectures at Harvard that would become How to Do Things With Words, and offering a seminar on excuses whose material would find its way into "A Plea for Excuses".Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1956-57. See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittegenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (New York: Oxford, 1979) xv. It was at this time that he met and befriended Noam Chomsky. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1956 to 1957. Austin died at the age of 48 of lung cancer. At the time, he was developing a semantic theory based on sound symbolism, using the English gl-words as data.
  3. After introducing several kinds of sentences which he asserts are neither true nor false, he turns in particular to one of these kinds of sentences, which he calls performative utterances or just "performatives". These he characterises by two features:
    • Again, though they may take the form of a typical indicative sentence, performative sentences are not used to describe (or "constate") and are thus not true or false; they have no truth-value.
    • Second, to utter one of these sentences in appropriate circumstances is not just to "say" something, but rather to perform a certain kind of action.J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 5.
    He goes on to say that when something goes wrong in connection with a performative utterance it is, as he puts it, "infelicitous", or "unhappy" rather than false.How to do Things with Words, 14.Austin seems to have thought, controversially, that a performative utterance must be infelicitous if it occurs in a poem. Robert Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued that what Austin intends by his comments on poetry is better than is usually thought, but what he offers poets is considerably worse; see his 'The Seriousness of Poetry' Essays in Criticism 59, 2009, 1-21. The action which is performed when a 'performative utterance' is issued belongs to what Austin later calls a speech-act J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, Second Edition (1976, Oxford University Press). pp40 (more particularly, the kind of action Austin has in mind is what he subsequently terms the illocutionary act). For example, if you say "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth," and the circumstances are appropriate in certain ways, then you will have done something special, namely, you will have performed the act of naming the ship. Other examples include: "I take this man as my lawfully wedded husband," used in the course of a marriage ceremony, or "I bequeath this watch to my brother," as occurring in a will. In all three cases the sentence is not being used to describe or state what one is 'doing', but being used to actually 'do' it. After numerous attempts to find more characteristics of performatives, and after having met with many difficulties, Austin makes what he calls a "fresh start", in which he considers "more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something". For example: John Smith turns to Sue Snub and says ‘Is Jeff’s shirt red?’, to which Sue replies ‘Yes’. John has produced a series of bodily movements which result in the production of a certain sound. Austin called such a performance a phonetic act, and called the act a phone. John’s utterance also conforms to the lexical and grammatical conventions of English—that is, John has produced an English sentence. Austin called this a phatic act, and labels such utterances phemes. John also referred to Jeff’s shirt, and to the colour red.To use a pheme with a more or less definite sense and reference is to utter a rheme, and to perform a rhetic act. Note that rhemes are a sub-class of phemes, which in turn are a sub-class of phones. One cannot perform a rheme without also performing a pheme and a phone. The performance of these three acts is the performance of a locution—it is the act of saying something. John has therefore performed a locutionary act. He has also done at least two other things. He has asked a question, and he has elicited an answer from Sue. Asking a question is an example of what Austin called an illocutionary act. Other examples would be making an assertion, giving an order, and promising to do something. To perform an illocutionary act is to use a locution with a certain force. It is an act performed in saying something, in contrast with a locution, the act of saying something. Eliciting an answer is an example of what Austin calls a perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something. Notice that if one successfully performs a perlocution, one also succeeds in performing both an illocution and a locution. In the theory of speech acts, attention has especially focused on the illocutionary act, much less on the locutionary and perlocutionary act, and only rarely on the subdivision of the locution into phone, pheme and rheme. How to Do Things With Words is based on lectures given at Oxford between 1951 and 1954, and then at Harvard in 1955.“Notes by J.L. Austin”. Bodleian Library at Oxford University.  “performative utterance”refers to a not truthevaluable action of “performing”, or “doing” a certain action. For example, when people say “I promise to do so and so”, they are generating the action of making a promise. In this case, without any flaw (the promise is flawlessly fulfilled), the “performative utterance” is “happy”, or to use JL. Austin’s word, “felicitous”; if on the other hand, one fails to do what he or she promised, it can be “unhappy”, or “infelicitous”. Notice that performative utterance is not truth-evaluable, which means nothing said can be judged based on truth or falsity. There are four types of performatives according to Austin: explicit, implicit, primitive, and inexplicit. "How to do things with words" written by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa records Austin's lectures on this topic. In this book, Austin offers examples for each type of performative mentioned above. For explicit performatives, he mentioned "I apologize", "I criticize" (Page 83), which are so explicit to receivers that it would not make sense for someone to ask "Does he really mean that?". Inexplicit performatives are opposite, so the receiver will have understandable doubts. For primary performatives, the example Austin gave is "I shall be there". Compared with explicit performatives, there is uncertainty in implicit performatives. People might ask if he or she is promising to be there with primary performatives, however, this uncertainty is not strong enough as in inexplicit performatives. Most examples given are explicit because it is easy to identify and observe, and identifying other performatives requires comparison and contrast with explicit performatives.Urmson, J.O, and Marina Sbisa. How to do things with words J.L. Austin, 2nd. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. Print. In the posthumously published Sense and Sensibilia,Austin had lectured on the material of this book many times in Oxford from about 1947 to 1959, and once at the University of California at Berkeley. See Warnock's Foreword. The title is an allusion to the novel Sense and Sensibility by Jane Austen. Austin criticises sense-data theories of perception, particularly that of A. J. Ayer in The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. Central to his case is an attack on a common argument from illusion (i.e., that cases of perceptual illusion show that on such occasions what we are directly aware of are mental images) and the "further bit of argument intended to establish that ...[we] always perceive sense-data." Austin argues that Ayer fails to understand the proper function of such words as "illusion", "delusion", "hallucination", "looks", "appears" and "seems", and uses them instead in a "special way...invented by philosophers."Sense and Sensibilia, 102. According to Austin, normally these words allow us to express reservations about our commitment to the truth of what we are saying, and that the introduction of sense-data adds nothing to our understanding of or ability to talk about what we see. Ayer responded to this critique in the essay "Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?".[출처 필요]
    G. J. Warnock's Foreword – Having taken a course from Austin on this topic at Oxford in 1947, Sir Geoffrey Warnock (1923-1995) says he put Austin's fragmentary lecture notes into sentence form, with the help of class notes from later students of the course, and claims to relate faithfully Austin's "argument" though not his exact wording.
    Chapter 1 – Austin intends to debunk a theory of sense perception that dates back thousands of years (to Heraclitus) and picks recent expressions of it by Ayer, who expressed it fairly clearly.
  4. Sense and Sensibilia, 1.
  5. The theory states that we never see or directly perceive material objects but only sense-data or sense perceptions. Rather than start with the varied things we see — say, pens, rainbows, and after-images — philosophers tend to ask facilely for a general kind of thing and wind up unfair to the facts and to language while using "a certain special, happy style of blinkering philosophical English," Austin says.
  6. This early paper contains a broad criticism of Idealism. The question set dealing with the existence of a priori concepts is treated only indirectly, by dismissing the concept of concept that underpins it. The first part of this paper takes the form of a reply to an argument for the existence of Universals: from observing that we do use words such as "grey" or "circular" and that we use a single term in each case, it follows that there must be a something that is named by such terms—a universal. Furthermore, since each case of "grey" or "circular" is different, it follows that universals themselves cannot be sensed. Austin carefully dismantles this argument, and in the process other transcendental arguments. He points out first that universals are not "something we stumble across", and that they are defined by their relation to particulars. He continues by pointing out that, from the observation that we use "grey" and "circular" as if they were the names of things, it simply does not follow that there is something that is named. In the process he dismisses the notion that "words are essentially proper names", asking "...why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one identical object' present which it denotes". In the second part of the article, he generalizes this argument against universals to address concepts as a whole. He points out that it is "facile" to treat concepts as if they were "an article of property". Such questions as "Do we possess such-and-such a concept" and "how do we come to possess such-and-such a concept" are meaningless, because concepts are not the sort of thing that one possesses. In the final part of the paper, Austin further extends the discussion to relations, presenting a series of arguments to reject the idea that there is some thing that is a relation. His argument likely follows from the conjecture of his colleague, S. V. Tezlaf, who questioned what makes "this" "that".
  7. The Meaning of a Word is a polemic against doing philosophy by attempting to pin down the meaning of the words used, arguing that 'there is no simple and handy appendage of a word called "the meaning of the word (x)"'. Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error.
  8. In Other Minds, one of his most highly acclaimed pieces,Passmore, ibid., 463 Austin criticizes the method that philosophers have used since Descartes to analyze and verify statements of the form "That person S feels X." This method works from the following three assumptions:
    • (1) We can know only if we intuit and directly feel what he feels.
    • (2) It is impossible to do so.
    • (3) It may be possible to find strong evidence for belief in our impressions.
    Although Austin agrees with (2), quipping that "we should be in a pretty predicament if I did", he found (1) to be false and (3) to be therefore unnecessary. The background assumption to (1), Austin claims, is that if I say that I know X and later find out that X is false, I did not know it. Austin believes that this is not consistent with the way we actually use language. He claims that if I was in a position where I would normally say that I know X, if X should turn out to be false, I would be speechless rather than self-corrective. He gives an argument that this is so by suggesting that believing is to knowing as intending is to promising— knowing and promising are the speech-act versions of believing and intending respectively.
  9. A Plea for Excuses is both a demonstration by example, and a defense of the methods of ordinary language philosophy, which proceeds on the conviction that: "...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetime of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonable practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchair of an afternoon—the most favourite alternative method."A Plea for excuses, in Austin, J. L., Philosophical Papers, p. 182
  10. in staunchly advocating the examination of the way words are ordinarily used in order to elucidate meaning and by this means avoid philosophical confusions. Unlike many ordinary language philosophers, however, Austin disavowed any overt indebtedness to Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

바깥 고리[편집]