사용자:Aspere/위임통치령 팔레스타인

비슷한 이름을 가진 위임통치령 문서에 따라 설립된 행정부인 팔레스타인 위임통치령, 트란스요르단에 관해서는 해당 문서를 참조하십시오.

국제연맹 - 위임통치령 팔레스타인 및 트란스요르단 각서
1922년 12월의 영국 칙명 제1785호로, 위임통치령 팔레스타인 및 트란스요르단 각서를 담고 있다.
생성일	1919년 중반 ~ 1922년 7월 22일
효력일	1923년 9월 29일
지역	UNOG 도서관; ref.: C.529. M.314. 1922. VI.
서명인	국제연맹
목적	팔레스타인 위임통치령과 트란스요르단의 영토 성립

위임통치령 팔레스타인(Mandate for Palestine)은 1918년 제1차 세계 대전의 종전으로 인해 오스만 제국으로부터 할양받은 영토인 팔레스타인과 트란스요르단의 영토를 영국의 위임통치 하에 둔다는 국제연맹의 위임통치령이었다. 프랑스가 기존에 맺어진 사이크스–피코 협정에서 양보한 1918년 클레망소-로이드 조지 협정 체결을 통해, 1920년 4월 산레모 회담에서 팔레스타인이 공식적으로 영국의 위임통치에 들어갔다. 트란스요르단은 시리아-프랑스 전쟁에서 시리아 아랍 왕국이 패전하며 위임통치령에 추가되었다. 1920년 7월 팔레스타인에서, 1921년 4월 트란스요르단에서 민정 통치가 시작되었으며, 위임통치령은 공식적으로 1923년 9월 29일부터, 팔레스타인은 1948년 5월 15일까지, 트란스요르단은 1946년 5월 25일까지 존속했다.

위임통치령 문서는 국제연맹 규약 제22조와, 주요 연합국 최고 회의의 산레모 결의안에 기초하고 있다. 오스만 제국의 영토에 세워진 위임통치령의 목적은 "스스로 일어설 수 있을 때까지 위임을 통해 통치의 조언과 조력"을 제공하기 위한 것으로 표기되어 있다. 팔레스타인과 트란스요르단 사이의 국경은 마지막 위임통치령 문서에서 합의되었으며, 북쪽의 프랑스 위임통치령 시리아와의 국경은 1920년 12월 23일 폴렛-뉴컴베 협정을 통해 확정되었다.

팔레스타인의 경우, 위임통치령은 영국이 인구 대부분을 차지하는 팔레스타인 아랍인과 함께, 밸푸어 선언에서의 "유대인을 위한 조국" 건설을 실천에 옮길 것을 요구하였다. 영국이 팔레스타인을 통치한 약 30년 간, 유대인과 팔레스타인 아랍인 공동체 간 시위, 폭동, 반란 등이 종종 일어났으며, 팔레스타인 위임통치령에서의 공동체 간 분쟁은 1936년 ~ 1939년 팔레스타인 독립 전쟁과 1944년 ~ 1948년 팔레스타인 위임통치령에서의 유대인 내란으로 이어졌다. 1947년 11월 29일 유대인과 아랍인 국가 둘을 만들고, 예루살렘을 유엔 신탁통치로 넘기자는, 유엔의 팔레스타인 분할안이 통과되었으며, 2주 후 영국 식민장관 아서 크리치 존스는 영국 위임통치령이 1948년 5월 15일 종료될 것이라고 발표하였다. 위임통치령 마지막 날 유대인 공동체는 이스라엘 독립 선언서를 발표하였다. 분할안의 실현이 실패한 후 이어진 제1차 중동 전쟁으로 인해 팔레스타인 위임통치령의 영토는 이스라엘, 요르단(서안), 이집트(가자)가 분할하였다.

1921년 3월 카이로 회담에서, 팔레스타인의 지도 하에 압둘라 1세가 통치하는 조건으로 위임통치령에 트란스요르단이 추가되었다. 이 지역은 제1차 세계 대전 말기부터 압둘라의 동생인 파이살을 군주로 다마스쿠스에서 아랍과 영국이 공동으로 통치했으며, 1920년 7월 파이살이 프랑스군에 패배한 후부터 무인지대가 되었기 때문에, 영국은 요르단과 팔레스타인의 연관짓기를 삼가려고 하였다. 트란스요르단은 1921년 3월 21일 영국이 위임통치령 문서에 제25조를 추가하며 법적인 형태로써 생겨났고, 1922년 9월 16일 트란스요르단 각서를 통해 영국의 지도 하에 별도의 '트란스요르단 관리 기구'가 만들어졌으며, 위임통치령이 생기기 다섯 달 전인 1923년 4월, 영국은 트란스요르단에서의 '독립적인 정부'를 인정할 것이라고 밝혔다. 트란스요르단의 자치권은 1928년 2월 20일 조약을 통해 증가하였으며, 1946년 3월 22일 런던 조약을 통해 완전히 독립하였다.

배경

제1차 세계 대전이 일어나기 전 영국 정부에서 발행한 민족지.

밸푸어 선언

 이 부분의 본문은 밸푸어 선언 (1917년)입니다.

1914년 오스만 제국의 전쟁 선포 직후 영국 전시 내각은 당시 오스만 통치 하이던 팔레스타인 지역의 미래를 고려하기 시작했다. 1917년 말 밸푸어 선언이 이루어질 즈음 미국은 제대로 참전하지 않았고, 러시아는 10월 혁명 도중이었기 때문에 세계 대전은 전체적으로 교착 상태였는데, 밸푸어 선언은 이러한 배경에서, 전 세계의 유대인 공동체가 연합국을 지지하게끔 하기 위한 선전의 일종으로써, 팔레스타인에 "유대인을 위한 조국" 설립을 돕겠다는 내용을 담아 11월 2일 발표되었다.

밸푸어 선언은 큰 정치 세력이 시온주의를 공개적으로 지지한 첫 사례였으며, 유대 국가를 의미하는 것인지를 확실하게 알 수 없도록, 그 전까지 국제법에서 사용된 적이 없는 조국(National home)이라는 모호한 용어를 고의적으로 사용하였다. 팔레스타인의 경계 또한 확실하게 정하지 않았으며, 영국 정부는 이후 팔레스타인 내(in Palestine)라는 용어가 유대인의 조국이 팔레스타인 전체를 차지하는 것이 아니라는 것을 의미한다고 확인하였다. 선언의 뒷 절반 가량은 인구 대부분을 차지하는 팔레스타인 아랍인의 시민권과 종교권을 보장할 것이라는 내용으로, 선언이 팔레스타인 원주민의 입지에 악영향을 주어 결과적으로 유대인을 외부인으로 낙인찍어 전 세계적인 반유대주의를 촉진할 것이라는 반대를 무마하기 위해 추가되었다.

밸푸어 선언의 내용은 이후 선언의 내용을 실천하기 위해 위임통치령 문서에 합쳐졌다. 선언 자체와 달리, 위임통치령 문서는 영국 정부가 준수해야 할 의무를 띄었다는 차이가 있다.

아랍 인구에 대한 약속

 이 부분의 본문은 후세인-맥마흔 서한입니다.

메카 샤리프와의 영토 협상을 보여주는 영국 정부 발행 지도.

사이크스와 피코가 서명한 지도.

1915년 7월부터 1916년 3월까지의 기간 동안, 헤자즈를 통치한 하심가의 대표 후세인 빈 알리와, 영국의 이집트 고등판무관 헨리 맥마흔 중령은 서로 편지 10통을 교환하였다. 이 중 특히 1915년 10월 24일자의 편지에서, 영국 정부는 메카 샤리프가 오스만 제국을 상대로 아랍 반란을 일으키는 대가로 아랍 독립을 인정하겠다고 동의하였다. 인력이나 현지에 대한 정보 등 아랍에 군사적 가치가 없었던 것은 아니지만, 이 합의의 주 목적은 오스만의 지하드 선포에 대응하고, 영국령 인도에 살던 7000만 무슬림 인구의 지지를 받기 위해서였다.

아랍 독립의 영역은 "메카 샤리프가 제안한 한계와 경계"로 정해졌다. 여기서 "다마스쿠스, 홈스, 하마, 알레포 지구"의 서쪽에 있는 해안은 제외하는데, 모호한 정의로 인해 현재까지 여러 분쟁이 일어나고 있으며, 이 중 특히 팔레스타인이 이 해안 제외 지역에 해당하는지에 대한 논쟁이 가장 두드러지게 나타난다. 1919년 파리 강화 회의에서 영국 총리 데이비드 로이드 조지는 프랑스 총리 조르주 클레망소에게 후세인-맥마흔 서한에는 조약적인 의무가 있다고 밝혔다.

프랑스에 대한 약속

 이 부분의 본문은 사이크스–피코 협정입니다.

비슷한 시기 오스만 제국의 분할 후 서로의 세력권을 정하기 위해 영국과 프랑스 사이 비밀 협정이 체결되었다. 1915년 11월 23일부터 1916년 1월 3일까지 이어진 협상을 통해, 1월 3일 영국 외교관 마크 사이크스와 프랑스 외교관 프랑수아 조르주 피코는 각서 초안에 합의했으며, 영국에서는 같은 해 5월 9일, 프랑스에서는 5월 16일 비준되었다. 사이크스-피코 협정에서는 영국의 통치 범위를 현재의 이스라엘 남부, 팔레스타인, 요르단, 이라크 남부에 더해, 지중해로의 접근을 위해 하이파와 아크레의 항구 주변 영역으로 정하였다. 팔레스타인의 경계는 팔레스타인 위임통치령보다 작았으며, '국제 통치' 하에 놓일 예정이었다. 사이크스-피코 협정은 이후 1918년 영국-프랑스 모두스 비벤디로 이어져, 레반트에서의 점령 적지 행정부 설립의 기반이 되었다.

국제연맹에 대한 약속

 이 부분의 본문은 위임통치령입니다.

위임통치령 체계는 베르사유 조약의 부분 I (국제연맹 규약) 제22조에 따라, '문명의 신성한 신뢰'로써 만들어졌다.

위임통치령은 우드로 윌슨이 1918년 1월 발표한 14개조 평화 원칙 중 자결권의 행사와, 유럽 제국의 확장 욕구 사이의 절충안으로서 만들어졌다. 위임통치령은 국제연맹 규약 제22조에 따라 만들어져, 베르사유 조약의 일부로서 1919년 6월 28일 체결되어, 1920년 1월 10일 발효되었다. 규약 제22조는 정확히 어떤 공동체, 민족, 영토를 다룰 것인지에 대한 계속된 논의 끝에, 조약 체결 2달 전에 작성되었으며, 제4, 5, 6항에 따라 위임통치령을 세 부류로 나누었다.

• A형: 튀르크 제국에 속하였던 영토
• B형: 중앙아프리카
• C형: 서남아프리카 및 남태평양 제도 일부

조약 체결 후 정식으로 영토가 결정되기 전까지 강화 회의는 잠시 휴회되었다.

위임통치령 체계는, 영토를 합병하지 않는다는 원칙과, 원주민을 위해 영토를 개발한다는 '문명의 신성한 신뢰'로써 통치한다는 원칙을 기반으로 한다. 위임통치령은 제3자인 국제연맹이 위임통치령의 의무 준수 여부를 감시한다는 점에서, 기존의 보호국 체계와 차이를 보였다. The mandates were to act as legal instruments containing the internationally agreed-upon terms for administering certain post-World War I territories on behalf of the League of Nations. These were of the nature of a treaty and a constitution, which contained minority-rights clauses that provided for the rights of petition and adjudication by the World Court.

The process of establishing the mandates consisted of two phases: the formal removal of sovereignty of the state previously controlling the territory, followed by the transfer of mandatory powers to individual states among the Allied powers. According to the Council of the League of Nations meeting of August 1920, "draft mandates adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers would not be definitive until they had been considered and approved by the League ... the legal title held by the mandatory Power must be a double one: one conferred by the Principal Powers and the other conferred by the League of Nations." Three steps were required to establish a mandate: "(1) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer a mandate on one of their number or on a third power; (2) the principal powers officially notify the council of the League of Nations that a certain power has been appointed mandatory for such a certain defined territory; and (3) the council of the League of Nations takes official cognisance of the appointment of the mandatory power and informs the latter that it [the council] considers it as invested with the mandate, and at the same time notifies it of the terms of the mandate, after ascertaining whether they are in conformance with the provisions of the covenant."

Assignment to Britain

팔레스타인

January 1919 Foreign Office memorandum setting out the borders of Palestine for the Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet before the Paris Peace Conference

Discussions about the assignment of the region's control began immediately after the war ended and continued at the Paris Peace Conference and the February 1920 Conference of London, and the assignment was made at the April 1920 San Remo conference. The Allied Supreme Council granted the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain, and those for Syria and Lebanon to France.

In anticipation of the Peace Conference, the British devised a "Sharifian Solution" to "[make] straight all the tangle" of their various wartime commitments. This proposed that three sons of Sharif Hussein – who had since become King of the Hejaz, and his sons emirs (princes) – would be installed as kings of newly created countries across the region agreed between McMahon and Hussein in 1915. The Hashemite delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, led by Hussein's third son Emir Faisal, had been invited by the British to represent the Arabs at the conference; they had wanted Palestine to be part of the proposed Arab state, and later modified this request to an Arab state under a British mandate. The delegation made two initial statements to the peace conference. The 1 January 1919 memorandum referred to the goal of "unit[ing] the Arabs eventually into one nation", defining the Arab regions as "from a line Alexandretta – Persia southward to the Indian Ocean". The 29 January memorandum stipulated that "from the line Alexandretta – Diarbekr southward to the Indian Ocean" (with the boundaries of any new states) were "matters for arrangement between us, after the wishes of their respective inhabitants have been ascertained", in a reference to Woodrow Wilson's policy of self-determination. In his 6 February 1919 presentation to the Paris Peace Conference, Faisal (speaking on behalf of King Hussein) asked for Arab independence or at least the right to choose the mandatory. The Hashemites had fought with the British during the war, and received an annual subsidy from Britain; according to the confidential appendix to the August 1919 King-Crane Commission report, "the French resent the payment by the English to the Emir Faisal of a large monthly subsidy, which they claim covers a multitude of bribes, and enables the British to stand off and show clean hands while Arab agents do dirty work in their interest."

The World Zionist Organization delegation to the Peace Conference – led by Chaim Weizmann, who had been the driving force behind the Balfour Declaration – also asked for a British mandate, asserting the "historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine". The confidential appendix to the King-Crane Commission report noted that "The Jews are distinctly for Britain as mandatory power, because of the Balfour declaration." The Zionists met with Faisal two weeks before the start of the conference in order to resolve their differences; the resulting Faisal–Weizmann Agreement was signed on 3 January 1919. Together with letter written by T. E. Lawrence in Faisal's name to Felix Frankfurter in March 1919, the agreement was used by the Zionist delegation to argue that their plans for Palestine had prior Arab approval; however, the Zionists omitted Faisal's handwritten caveat that the agreement was conditional on Palestine being within the area of Arab independence.

The French privately ceded Palestine and Mosul to the British in a December 1918 amendment to the Sykes–Picot Agreement; the amendment was finalised at a meeting in Deauville in September 1919. Matters were confirmed at the San Remo conference, which formally assigned the mandate for Palestine to the United Kingdom under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Although France required the continuation of its religious protectorate in Palestine, Italy and Great Britain opposed it. France lost the religious protectorate but, thanks to the Holy See, continued to enjoy liturgical honors in Mandatory Palestine until 1924 (when the honours were abolished). As Weizmann reported to his WZO colleagues in London in May 1920, the boundaries of the mandated territories were unspecified at San Remo and would "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers" at a later stage.

트란스요르단 추가

 샤리프 방안, 공위시대 (요르단) 및 트란스요르단 토후국의 설립 문서를 참고하십시오.

1918년 11월 토머스 에드워드 로런스가 전시내각에 제출한 최초의 샤리프 방안으로, 1921년 3월 카이로 회담으로 대체되었다.

1915년 후세인-맥마흔 서한과 1916년 사이크스–피코 협정에 따라, 트란스요르단은 아랍 국가의 일부나 아랍 국가의 연맹이 될 예정이었다. British forces retreated in spring 1918 from Transjordan after their first and second attacks on the territory, indicating their political ideas about its future; they had intended the area to become part of an Arab Syrian state. The British subsequently defeated the Ottoman forces in Transjordan in late September 1918, just a few weeks before the Ottoman Empire's overall surrender.

Transjordan was not mentioned during the 1920 discussions at San Remo, at which the Mandate for Palestine was awarded. Britain and France agreed that the eastern border of Palestine would be the Jordan river as laid out in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. That year, two principles emerged from the British government. The first was that the Palestine government would not extend east of the Jordan; the second was the government's chosen – albeit disputed – interpretation of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, which proposed that Transjordan be included in the area of "Arab independence" (excluding Palestine).

Herbert Samuel's proclamation in Salt on 21 August 1920 at the courtyard of the Assumption of Our Lady Catholic Church. Samuel was admonished a few days later by Curzon, who said: "There must be no question of setting up any British administration in that area".

Regarding Faisal's Arab Kingdom of Syria, the French removed Hashim al-Atassi's newly proclaimed nationalist government and expelled King Faisal from Syria after the 23 July 1920 Battle of Maysalun. The French formed a new Damascus state after the battle, and refrained from extending their rule into the southern part of Faisal's domain; Transjordan became for a time a no-man's land or, as Samuel put it, "politically derelict".

위임통치령의 국경에 대한 의문이 언급되지 않았다는 점에서, 정치적 상황이 충분히 명료하게 다루어지지 않았다는 여러 불만이 있었습니다. 위임통치령은 이제 공표되어, 한 가지 예외를 제외하고는 바꿀 수 없으며, 이 예외를 지금부터 설명하겠습니다. 처음 위임통치령에서 위임통치령의 범위를 벗어난 것으로 보았던 트란스요르단이 이제 포함되어 있습니다. 현재 국제연맹에 제출된 위임통치령 제25조에는 이 변경점이 포함되었습니다. 이로써, 드 리엠 씨, 동쪽 국경에 관한 문제는 해답을 얻었습니다. 이 질문은 만약 서안 지구가 꽉 차 트란스요르단으로 넘쳐 흐르면 더 좋은 해답을 얻을 것입니다. 북쪽 국경은 아직도 만족스럽지 못합니다. 우리는 모든 진술을 했고, 모든 주장을 제기했으며, 영국 정부는 이에 관하여 모든 것을 했습니다. 유감스러운 말씀이지만, 우리가 원하는 것을 받지 못했습니다. 우리가 받은 유일한 것은 수자원권에 대한 논의에서 발언을 할 수 있게끔 하는 양보뿐이었습니다. 그리고 바로 일주일 전, 팔레스타인 통치기구가 군인 몇 명의 압력을 받아 우리의 국경을 바꾸고자 했을 때 우리는 제일 강하게 항의하였으며 합의했던 선을 따라 국경을 확실시했습니다. 만족스럽지는 않지만, 우리가 가진 힘으로는 다른 아무것도 얻을 수 없습니다. 위임통치령도 마찬가지입니다.
—세계 시온주의 기구 회장 하임 바이츠만의 연설
대회는 유대인이 항상 에레츠 이스라엘의 필수적인 부분으로 여겼던 트란스요르단이 다시 팔레스타인 위임통치령의 땅으로 흡수되는 것을 만족스럽게 여긴다. 대회는 행정부의 모든 노력에도 불구하고 에레츠 이스라엘의 북쪽 국경이 만족스러운 해결책을 얻지 못한 것을 개탄한다.
—대회 발표, III. 국경

1921년 9월 1일~ 14일에, 밸푸어 선언 이후 처음으로 열린 12차 시온주의자 대회에서의 발췌문으로, 제25조가 시온주의의 승리로 표현되었는데, 당시 제25조의 의도가 트란스요르단을 제외하려는 것이라는 사실은 발표되지 않았던 상태였다.

After the French occupation, the British suddenly wanted to know "what is the 'Syria' for which the French received a mandate at San Remo?" and "does it include Transjordania?". British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon ultimately decided that it did not; Transjordan would remain independent, but in a close relationship with Palestine. On 6 August 1920, Curzon wrote to newly appointed High Commissioner Herbert Samuel about Transjordan: "I suggest that you should let it be known forthwith that in the area south of the Sykes–Picot line, we will not admit French authority and that our policy for this area to be independent but in closest relations with Palestine." Samuel replied to Curzon, "After the fall of Damascus a fortnight ago ... Sheiks and tribes east of Jordan utterly dissatisfied with Shareefian Government most unlikely would accept revival", and asked to put parts of Transjordan directly under his administrative control. Two weeks later, on 21 August, Samuel visited Transjordan without authorisation from London; at a meeting with 600 leaders in Salt, he announced the independence of the area from Damascus and its absorption into the mandate (proposing to quadruple the area under his control by tacit capitulation). Samuel assured his audience that Transjordan would not be merged with Palestine. Curzon was in the process of reducing British military expenditures, and was unwilling to commit significant resources to an area considered of marginal strategic value. He immediately repudiated Samuel's action, and sent (via the Foreign Office) a reiteration of his instructions to minimize the scope of British involvement in the area: "There must be no question of setting up any British administration in that area". At the end of September 1920, Curzon instructed an Assistant Secretary at the Foreign Office, Robert Vansittart, to leave the eastern boundary of Palestine undefined and avoid "any definite connection" between Transjordan and Palestine to leave the way open for an Arab government in Transjordan. Curzon subsequently wrote in February 1921, "I am very concerned about Transjordania ... Sir H.Samuel wants it as an annex of Palestine and an outlet for the Jews. Here I am against him."

Abdullah, the brother of recently deposed King Faisal, marched into Ma'an at the head of an army of from 300 to 2,000 men on 21 November 1920. Between then and the end of March 1921, Abdullah's army occupied all of Transjordan with some local support and no British opposition.

12 March 1921 British memorandum explaining the situation of Transjordan: "His Majesty's Government have been entrusted with the Mandate for 'Palestine'. If they wish to assert their claim to Trans-Jordan and to avoid raising with other Powers the legal status of that area, they can only do so by proceeding upon the assumption that Trans-Jordan forms part of the area covered by the Palestine Mandate. In default of this assumption Trans-Jordan would be left, under article 132 of the Treaty of Sèvres, to the disposal of the principal Allied Powers." From 12 to 25 March 1921, the inclusion of Transjordan in the mandate was formulated by the British government.

25 March 1921 proposal, approved a week later, to include Transjordan via Article 25: "On the assumption that ... provision is made in some way in final political arrangements as regards Trans-Jordania for its inclusion within the boundaries of Palestine as eventually fixed, but under a form of administration different from that of Palestine, however undesirable it may be for His Majesty's Government themselves to propose alterations of the mandates at this stage, they were inclined to view that when the "A" mandates come to be considered by the Council of the League it would be wise in this case to propose to that body the insertion ... after article 24 of the Palestine mandate ..."

The Cairo Conference was convened on 12 March 1921 by Winston Churchill, then Britain's Colonial Secretary, and lasted until 30 March. It was intended to endorse an arrangement whereby Transjordan would be added to the Palestine mandate, with Abdullah as the emir under the authority of the High Commissioner, and with the condition that the Jewish National Home provisions of the Palestine mandate would not apply there. On the first day of the conference, the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office set out the situation of Transjordan in a memorandum. On 21 March 1921, the Foreign and Colonial Office legal advisers decided to introduce Article 25 into the Palestine Mandate to allow for the addition of Transjordan.

Drafting

The intended mandatory powers were required to submit written statements to the League of Nations during the Paris Peace Conference proposing the rules of administration in the mandated areas. Drafting of the Palestine mandate began well before it was formally awarded at San Remo in April 1920, since it was evident after the end of the war that Britain was the favored power in the region. The mandate had a number of drafts: the February 1919 Zionist proposals to the peace conference; a December 1919 "compromise" draft between the British and the Zionists; a June 1920 draft after Curzon's "watering down", and the December 1920 draft submitted to the League of Nations for comment.

1919: Initial Zionist-British discussions

In the spring of 1919 the experts of the British Delegation of the Peace Conference in Paris opened informal discussions with representatives of the Zionist Organisation on the draft of a Mandate for Palestine. In the drafting and discussion in Paris Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Sokolow received valuable aid from the American Zionist Delegation. Towards the end of 1919 the British Delegation returned to London and as during the protracted negotiations Dr. Weizmann was often unavoidably absent in Palestine, and Mr. Sokolow in Paris, the work was carried on for some time by a temporary political committee, of which the Right Hon. Sir Herbert (then Mr.) Samuel, Dr. Jacobson, Dr. Feiwel, Mr. Sacher (of the Manchester Guardian), Mr. Landman, and Mr. Ben Cohen were the first members. The later stage of the drafting negotiations were carried on by a sub-comimittee consisting of Messrs. Sacher, Stein and Ben Cohen, formed specially for the Mandate and frontier questions. Drafts for the Mandate were prepared for the Zionist leaders by Professor Frankfurter and Mr. Gans. After consultation with various members of the Actions Committee and Palestinian [Jewish] delegates then in Paris, these proposals were handed to the British Delegation and were largely embodied in the first tentative draft, dated July 15th, 1919.
—Political Report, 2. The Palestine Mandate Negotiations, 1919–1921.

Excerpts relating to the creation of the first full draft of the Mandate for Palestine, from a September 1921 Zionist Organization report of the 12th Zionist Congress, the first following the Balfour Declaration.

The February 1919 Zionist Proposal to the Peace Conference was not discussed at the time, since the Allies' discussions were focused elsewhere. It was not until July 1919 that direct negotiations began between the British Foreign Office and the Zionists, after the production of a full draft mandate by the British. The British draft contained 29 articles, compared to the Zionist proposal's five articles. However, the Zionist Organisation Report stated that a draft was presented by the Zionist Organization to the British on 15 July 1919.

Balfour authorised diplomatic secretary Eric Forbes Adam to begin negotiations with the Zionist Organization. On the Zionist side, the drafting was led by Ben Cohen on behalf of Weizmann, Felix Frankfurter and other Zionist leaders. By December 1919, they had negotiated a "compromise" draft.

1920: Curzon negotiations

The draft mandate, published at Cmd. 1176, was submitted by Lord Balfour on 7 December 1920 to the Secretariat General of the League of Nations for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. The changes between December 1920 and July 1922 were primarily focused on protection of the Holy Places (Articles 14 and 21) and the addition of Transjordan (Article 25).

Although Curzon took over from Balfour in October, he did not play an active role in the drafting until mid-March. Israeli historian Dvorah Barzilay-Yegar notes that he was sent a copy of the December draft and commented, "... the Arabs are rather forgotten ...". When Curzon received the draft of 15 March 1920, he was "far more critical" and objected to "... formulations that would imply recognition of any legal rights ..." (for example, that the British government would be "responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home and the development of a self-governing Commonwealth ..."). Curzon insisted on revisions until the 10 June draft removed his objections; the paragraph recognising the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine was removed from the preamble, and "self-governing commonwealth" was replaced by "self-governing institutions". "The recognition of the establishment of the Jewish National Home as the guiding principle in the execution of the Mandate" was omitted.

After strenuous objection to the proposed changes, the statement concerning the historical connections of the Jews with Palestine was re-incorporated into the Mandate in December 1920. The draft was submitted to the League of Nations on 7 December 1920, and was published in the Times on 3 February 1921.

1921: Transjordan article

The inclusion of Article 25 was approved by Curzon on 31 March 1921, and the revised final draft of the mandate was forwarded to the League of Nations on 22 July 1922. Article 25 permitted the mandatory to "postpone or withhold application of such provisions of the mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions" in that region. The final text of the Mandate includes an Article 25, which states:

In the territories lying between the Jordan [river] and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions.

The new article was intended to enable Britain "to set up an Arab administration and to withhold indefinitely the application of those clauses of the mandate which relate to the establishment of the National Home for the Jews", as explained in a Colonial Office letter three days later. This created two administrative areas – Palestine, under direct British rule, and the autonomous Emirate of Transjordan under the rule of the Hashemite family – in accordance with the British Government's amended interpretation of the 1915 McMahon–Hussein Correspondence. At discussions in Jerusalem on 28 March, Churchill proposed his plan to Abdullah that Transjordan would be accepted into the mandatory area as an Arab country apart from Palestine and that it would be (initially for six months) under the nominal rule of the Emir Abdullah. Churchill said that Transjordan would not form part of the Jewish national home to be established west of the River Jordan:

Trans-Jordania would not be included in the present administrative system of Palestine, and therefore the Zionist clauses of the mandate would not apply. Hebrew would not be made an official language in Trans-Jordania and the local Government would not be expected to adopt any measures to promote Jewish immigration and colonisation.

Abdullah's six-month trial was extended, and by the following summer he began to voice his impatience at the lack of formal confirmation.

1921–22: Palestinian Arab attempted involvement

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A New York Times report on 31 August 1921 on the Syrian–Palestinian Congress's message to the League of Nations "of the desire of the Syrian and Palestinian populations for complete independence outside of any power"

The drafting was carried out with no input from any Arabs, despite the fact that their disagreement with the Balfour Declaration was well known. Palestinian political opposition began to organise in 1919 in the form of the Palestine Arab Congress, which formed from the local Muslim-Christian Associations. In March 1921, new British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill came to the region to form British policy on the ground at the Cairo Conference. The leader of the Palestine congress, Musa al-Husayni, had tried to present the views of the Executive Committee in Cairo and (later) Jerusalem but was rebuffed both times. In the summer of 1921, the 4th Palestine Arab Congress sent a delegation led by Musa al-Husayni to London to negotiate on behalf of the Muslim and Christian population. On the way, the delegation held meetings with Pope Benedict XV and diplomats from the League of Nations in Geneva (where they also met Balfour, who was non-committal). In London, they had three meetings with Winston Churchill in which they called for reconsideration of the Balfour Declaration, revocation of the Jewish National Home policy, an end to Jewish immigration and that Palestine should not be severed from its neighbours. All their demands were rejected, although they received encouragement from some Conservative Members of Parliament.

Musa al-Husayni led a 1922 delegation to Ankara and then to the Lausanne Conference, where (after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's victories against the Greek army in Turkey) the Treaty of Sèvres was about to be re-negotiated. The Palestinian delegation hoped that with Atatürk's support, they would be able to get the Balfour Declaration and mandate policy omitted from the new treaty. The delegation met with Turkey's lead negotiator, İsmet Pasha, who promised that "Turkey would insist upon the Arabs’ right of self-determination and ... the Palestinian delegation should be permitted to address the conference"; however, he avoided further meetings and other members of the Turkish delegation made clear their intention to "accept the post–World War I status quo". During the negotiations, Ismet Pasha refused to recognise or accept the mandates; although they were not referenced in the final treaty, it had no impact on the implementation of the mandate policy set in motion three years earlier.

1922: Final amendments

Each of the principal Allied powers had a hand in drafting the proposed mandate, although some (including the United States) had not declared war on the Ottoman Empire and did not become members of the League of Nations.

영국 위임통치령 문서의 주요 초안
초안	협상 대상자	전 초안과의 주요 차이점
3 February 1919 Zionist Organization draft (Wikisource)	Zionist Organization draft signed by Walter Rothschild, the Zionist Organization (Nahum Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann); the Zionist Organization of America (Julian Mack, Stephen S. Wise, Harry Friedenwald, Jacob de Haas, Mary Fels, Louis Robison and Bernard Flexner), and the Russian Zionist Organization (Israel Rosoff). Submitted in February and reviewed by the British in April 1919.	First version submitted to the Peace Conference. The draft contained only five clauses, of which the fifth contained five sub-clauses.
15 July 1919 British Foreign Office draft (Wikisource)	British Foreign Office (Political Section) draft after discussion with the Zionist Organization, which later claimed that the proposals they put to the British were "largely embodied" in this draft.	First official draft of the mandate The preamble and 29 clauses adhered closely to the principles proposed by the Zionists. Relevant changes included: In the preamble: "recogniseing the historical titleconnection of the Jewish people towith Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Homeclaim which this gives them to find a national home in that country" The reduction of the British obligation to accept advice from a Jewish Council
24 September 1919 Zionist Organization proposal (Wikisource)	Zionist Organization counterproposal presented by Cohen to Forbes-Adam, with amendments drafted by the Zionist "Actions Committee" in London in July and August	'팔레스타인'의 번역으로써 '에레츠 이스라엘'이 추가됨. '그 국가 내에서 조국을 설립한다'를 '팔레스타인을 조국으로써 재편성한다'로 대체함. Added that the Jewish Agency "shall have a pre-emptive right" over economic concessions; Removed article guaranteeing the property rights of religious organisations; Required the Government to recognise the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays as legal days of rest.
11 December 1919 "provisionally agreed upon between Zionist Organisation and British Delegation" (Wikisource)	Provisional agreement reached after discussions in Paris in early December between Forbes-Adam and Herbert William Malkin for the British Foreign Office and Cohen for the Zionist Organization. Forbes-Adam warned the Zionists that "this was not the final word".	"Almost identical" to the September Zionist proposal with respect to the primary areas of Zionist concern; e.g. the preamble was substantially unchanged. Removed the article: "The control and administration of Moslem Wakuf property in Palestine shall be undertaken by the Government, who shall respect Moslem law and the wishes of the founders, sofar as may be consistent with the public interests of the country as a whole"; Also removed was an article proposing that civil-law matters should be subject to separate judicial arrangements for Jews and Muslims; Further detail was added to the articles about Jewish acquisition of citizenship and the protection of foreigners.
10 June 1920 Submitted to the British Cabinet (Wikisource)	Curzon
25 September 1920 Submitted to the British Cabinet (Wikisource)	Curzon
7 December 1920 Submitted for review by the League of Nations (LoN) (Wikisource)	Curzon	Comparison with the 25 September 1920 draft: Preamble restored: "Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country"; Two articles regarding potential boundary demarcation removed (Articles 2 and 3 of the September version).
24 July 1922 Approved by the Council of the LoN (Wikisource)	Council of the League of Nations; Transjordan change proposed by the British government at the March 1921 Cairo Conference; other changes proposed by other members of the Council of the League.	Comparison with the 7 December 1920 draft: Removal of references to defunct Treaty of Sèvres, including in the Preamble (Sèvres Art. 95 and Art. 132), Article 14 (Holy Places, Sèvres Art. 95) and Article 21 (Law of Antiquities, Sèvres Art. 421); Article 25 (Transjordan) added.

Approvals

British Parliament

British public and government opinion became increasingly opposed to state support for Zionism, and even Sykes had begun to change his views in late 1918. In February 1922 Churchill telegraphed Samuel, who had begun his role as High Commissioner for Palestine 18 months earlier, asking for cuts in expenditure and noting:

In both Houses of Parliament there is growing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by recent Northcliffe articles. I do not attach undue importance to this movement, but it is increasingly difficult to meet the argument that it is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, already overwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost of imposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.

The House of Lords rejected a Palestine Mandate incorporating the Balfour Declaration by 60 votes to 25 after the June 1922 issuance of the Churchill White Paper, following a motion proposed by Lord Islington. The vote was only symbolic, since it was subsequently overruled by a vote in the House of Commons after a tactical pivot and a number of promises by Churchill.

In February 1923, after a change in government, Cavendish laid the foundation for a secret review of Palestine policy in a lengthy memorandum to the Cabinet:

It would be idle to pretend that the Zionist policy is other than an unpopular one. It has been bitterly attacked in Parliament and is still being fiercely assailed in certain sections of the press. The ostensible grounds of attack are threefold:(1) the alleged violation of the McMahon pledges; (2) the injustice of imposing upon a country a policy to which the great majority of its inhabitants are opposed; and (3) the financial burden upon the British taxpayer ...

His cover note asked for a statement of policy to be made as soon as possible, and for the cabinet to focus on three questions: (1) whether or not pledges to the Arabs conflict with the Balfour declaration; (2) if not, whether the new government should continue the policy set down by the old government in the 1922 White Paper and (3) if not, what alternative policy should be adopted.

Stanley Baldwin, who took over as Prime Minister on 22 May 1923, set up a cabinet subcommittee in June 1923 whose terms of reference were to "examine Palestine policy afresh and to advise the full Cabinet whether Britain should remain in Palestine and whether if she remained, the pro-Zionist policy should be continued". The Cabinet approved the report of this subcommittee on 31 July 1923; when presenting the subcommittee's report to the Cabinet, Curzon concluded that "wise or unwise, it is well nigh impossible for any government to extricate itself without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not honour." Describing it as "nothing short of remarkable", international law specialist Professor John B. Quigley noted that the government was admitting to itself that its support for Zionism had been prompted by considerations having nothing to do with the merits of Zionism or its consequences for Palestine. Documents related to the 1923 reappraisal remained secret until the early 1970s.

미국

미국은 국제연맹의 회원국이 아니었다. 위임통치령 문서가 국제연맹에 제출된 후 2달이 경과한 시점인 1921년 2월 23일, 미국은 국제연맹 총회의 결의 전 의견을 제시할 권한을 달라고 요청했으며, 일주일 후 승인을 받았다. 다음 해 5월 14일까지 이어진 논의 끝에, 미국 정부는 팔레스타인 위임통치령에 관련하여 영국과의 합의 사항을 발표했으며, 조건 중에는 '위임통치령의 문구에 어떠한 변화를 주기 전 미국의 동의를 얻어야 한다'는 내용도 있었다. 미국 국무부의 반대에도 불구하고 같은 해 9월 22일에는 의회의 승인을 얻었다.

1924년 12월 3일, 미국은 영국과의 조약인 팔레스타인 위임통치령 협약을 체결하였으며, 내용은 미국이 '통치에 동의한다'(제1조)와, 재산권이나 사업권 등 미국의 8가지 염려 사항과 관련한 것이었다. 국무부는 위임통치령에서 미국이 차지하는 위치에 대한 보고서를 제작하였다.

국제연맹 총회: 위임통치령

On 17 May 1922, in a discussion of the date on which the question of the Draft Mandate for Palestine should be placed on the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations, Lord Balfour informed the Council of his government's understanding of the role of the League in the creation of mandates:

[the] Mandates were not the creation of the League, and they could not in substance be altered by the League. The League's duties were confined to seeing that the specific and detailed terms of the mandates were in accordance with the decisions taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, and that in carrying out these mandates the Mandatory Powers should be under the supervision—not under the control—of the League. A mandate was a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they exercised over the conquered territory.

The New York Times, 20 July 1922, two days before the League of Nations' conditional approval of the Mandate.

The mandates come into force according to the Council of the League of Nations minutes, 29 September 1923

Documents from the time of conditional approval and effective date. The New York Times article describes Balfour falling asleep during the meetings and the reaction in Palestine to the House of Lords' repudiation of the Mandate a month earlier.

The Council of the League of Nations met between 19 and 24 July 1922 to approve the class A mandates for Palestine and Syria (minutes of the meetings can be read here). The Palestine mandate was approved on 22 July 1922 at a private meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at St. James Palace in London, giving the British formal international recognition of the position they had held de facto in the region since the end of 1917 in Palestine and since 1920–21 in Transjordan. The Council stated that the mandate was approved and would come into effect "automatically" when the dispute between France and Italy was resolved. A public statement confirming this was made by the president of the council on 24 July. 1922년 10월 로마 진군 후 총리가 된 베니토 무솔리니는 위임통치령의 적용을 지연시켰다. 1923년 8월 23일, 앙카라의 튀르키예 의회는 재적 235명 중 찬성 215명으로, 로잔 조약을 비준하였다.

The Council of the League of Nations determined that the two mandates had come into effect at its 29 September 1923 meeting. The dispute between France and Italy was resolved by the Turkish ratification.

국제연맹 총회: 트란스요르단 각서

1922년 9월 16일, 국제연맹 총회의 트란스요르단 각서 승인.

1922년 7월 있었던 위임통치령 승인 직후, 식민성은 제25조를 적용하기 위한 각서를 준비했다. 1922년 9월 16일 국제연맹 총회는, 유대인 정착촌과 관련한 조항에서 트란스요르단을 제외하는 방안이 담긴, 트란스요르단 각서를 승인하였다. 밸푸어는 국제연맹 총회에 각서를 제출하며, 각서에 대한 배경을 설명하였다. 이와 관련해서 회의록에 담긴 내용은 다음과 같다.

밸푸어 경은 자신의 동료들에게, 1922년 7월 24일 런던 의회에서 승인한 팔레스타인 위임통치령 제25조에서는, 요르단 동쪽에 있는 팔레스타인 영토는 나머지 팔레스타인과 다른 정권 하에 있어야 함을 나타낸다고 상기시켰다. (중략) 영국 정부는 지금 단지 이 조항을 이행할 것을 제안했을 뿐이다. 이는 항상 연맹이 심사숙고하고 영국 정부가 승인한 정책의 일부였으며, 후자는 이제 이를 이행하기를 원한다. 제25조에 구체화되어 있는 이 정책을 이행하기 위해, 밸푸어 경은 이 영토와 관련하여 위임통치령을 수정하는 일련의 결의안을 총회가 통과시켜 달라고 요청했다. 이 결의안들의 목적은 요르단 서쪽의 유대인에게 조국을 주기 위한 특별 조항을 트란스요르단에서 철회하는 것이었다.

튀르키예

튀르키예는 제1차 세계 대전의 패전국으로 분류되었으며, 1932년까지 국제연맹에 가입하지 않았다. 산레모 회담에서 연합국이 진행한, 오스만 영토에 대한 위임통치령 할당은, 1920년 8월 10일 연합국과 오스만 제국 간에 체결한 세브르 조약에 기록되어 있다. 하지만 오스만 정부는 세브르 조약을 비준하지 않았으며, 특히 조약 반대를 주도했던 무스타파 케말 아타튀르크는 바로 튀르키예 독립 전쟁을 진행하였다. 1922년 11월 세브르 조약을 대체할 조약을 만들기 위해 진행한 회담 결과, 1923년 7월 24일 로잔 조약이 체결되며, 앙카라 조약에서 동의한 전선보다 남쪽의 영토 전체에 대한 영유권을 포기하였다. 영유권 주장을 포기한 영토에는 팔레스타인이 포함되어 있다.

주요 쟁점

유대인을 위한 조국 (전문, 제2, 제4, 제6, 제7, 제11조)

"시온주의자의 환호. 영국 위임통치령 팔레스타인 환영받다" (타임스, 1920년 4월 26일 월요일, 산레모 협정 후)

 이 부분의 본문은 유대인을 위한 조국입니다.

위임통치령 문서 전문의 2번째 문단의 내용은 다음과 같다.

주요 연합국은 위임통치령에게 브리튼 국왕 폐하의 정부에 의하고 앞서 언급한 국가가 도입한, 팔레스타인 내 유대인을 위한 조국을 설립하는 것을 지지하는 1917년 11월 2일 이루어진 기존의 선언을 실현하기 위한 책임이 있다고 동의한 바 있으므로, 기존부터 팔레스타인에 존재하는 비유대인 공동체의 시민권 및 종교권이나, 다른 국가에서 유대인이 누리는 권리와 정치적 지위에 악영향을 끼칠 수 있는 어떠한 행동도 취해져서는 안 된다고 분명히 이해되고 있으며...

바이츠만은 자신의 회고록에, 위임통치령에서 제일 중요한 부분이자 제일 어려운 협상은 전문에서 '유대인과 팔레스타인의 역사적 연관성을 인정'한 부분이었다고 기록했다. Curzon and the Italian and French governments rejected early drafts of the mandate because the preamble had contained a passage which read, "Recognising, moreover, the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute it their national home..." The Palestine Committee set up by the Foreign Office recommended that the reference to "the claim" be omitted. The Allies had already noted the historical connection in the Treaty of Sèvres, but had not acknowledged a legal claim. Lord Balfour suggested an alternative which was accepted and included in the preamble immediately after the paragraph quoted above:

Whereas recognition has thereby [i.e. by the Treaty of Sèvres] been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country;

위임통치령 문서의 제4조에는 시온주의 기구가 언급되며, 1920년 9월 초안에서부터 "행정부가 적절하다는 의견을 내놓는 한"이라는 조건이 추가되었다. '유대인 기구'는 제4조, 제6조, 제11조에서 언급되는데, Article 4 of the mandate provided for "the recognition of an appropriate Jewish agency as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population of Palestine," effectively establishing what became the "Jewish Agency for Palestine". Article 7 stated, "The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine." The proviso to this objective of the mandate was that "nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".

Religious and communal issues (Articles 13–16 and 23)

Religious and communal guarantees, such as freedom of religion and education, were made in general terms without reference to a specific religion. The Vatican and the Italian and French governments concentrated their efforts on the issue of the Holy Places and the rights of the Christian communities, making their legal claims on the basis of the former Protectorate of the Holy See and the French Protectorate of Jerusalem. The Catholic powers saw an opportunity to reverse the gains made by the Greek and Russian Orthodox communities in the region during the previous 150 years, as documented in the Status Quo. The Zionists had limited interest in this area.

Britain would assume responsibility for the Holy Places under Article 13 of the mandate. The idea of an International Commission to resolve claims on the Holy Places, formalised in Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres, was taken up again in article 14 of the Palestinian Mandate. Negotiations about the commission's formation and role were partly responsible for the delay in ratifying the mandate. Article 14 of the mandate required Britain to establish a commission to study, define, and determine the rights and claims relating to Palestine's religious communities. This provision, which called for the creation of a commission to review the Status Quo of the religious communities, was never implemented.

Article 15 required the mandatory administration to ensure that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship were permitted. According to the article, "No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief." The High Commissioner established the authority of the Orthodox Rabbinate over the members of the Jewish community and retained a modified version of the Ottoman Millet system. Formal recognition was extended to eleven religious communities, which did not include non-Orthodox Jews or the Protestant Christian denominations.

Transjordan (Article 25 and Transjordan memorandum)

The public clarification and implementation of Article 25, more than a year after it was added to the mandate, misled some "into imagining that Transjordanian territory was covered by the conditions of the Mandate as to the Jewish National Home before August 1921". This would, according to professor of modern Jewish history Bernard Wasserstein, result in "the myth of Palestine's 'first partition' [which became] part of the concept of 'Greater Israel' and of the ideology of Jabotinsky's Revisionist movement". Palestinian-American academic Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, then chair of the Northwestern University political science department, suggested that the "Jordan as a Palestinian State" references made by Israeli spokespeople may reflect "the same [mis]understanding".

On 25 April 1923, five months before the mandate came into force, the independent administration was recognised in a statement made in Amman:

Subject to the approval of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty will recognise the existence of an independent Government in Trans-jordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir Abdullah, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty in a position to fulfil his international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an Agreement to be concluded with His Highness.

Legality

1921 Zionist Organization legal argument, written by barrister William Finlay about the Mandate for Palestine and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations

The legality of the mandate has been disputed in detail by scholars, particularly its consistency with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to the mandate's preamble, the mandate was granted to Britain "for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations". That article, which concerns entrusting the "tutelage" of colonies formerly under German and Turkish sovereignty to "advanced nations", specifies "[c]ommunities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" which "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." During the mandate, Palestinian Arab leaders cited the article as proving their assertion that the British were obliged (under the terms of the mandate) to facilitate the eventual creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine.

국경

제1차 세계 대전 종전 후 팔레스타인 통치안 3개.

  국제 통치 (1916년 사이크스–피코 협정)

  시온주의 기구안 (1919년 파리 강화 회의)

  1923년 ~ 1948년 팔레스타인 위임통치령의 최종 국경

 이스라엘의 국경 및 요르단의 국경 문서에 이 부분의 추가 정보가 있습니다.

위임통치령 팔레스타인에 해당하는 영토는, 제1차 세계 대전 이전 오스만 제국의 행정 구분에서는 예루살렘 무타사리프령과 베이루트 빌라예트의 남부(시리아 빌라예트 남부 및 헤자즈 빌라예트 북부)에 해당했다. 전쟁 중 영국은 헤자즈 원정군과 이집트 원정군 사이의 경계를 아카바 남쪽의 점에서 마안 남쪽의 점을 잇는 직선으로 정의했으며, 이집트 원정군 전역은 다시 팔레스타인 전역과, 파이살의 아랍 반란군 주도의 시리아 전역으로 나뉘었다. 전후 이 지역은 남부 OETA와, 아랍인 총독이 통치한 동부 OETA로 나뉘었는데, 구분 방식 자체는 같았다. 이츠하크 길하르는 "팔레스타인 군정은 항상 트란스요르단을 관할 바깥에 있는 별도의 행정부로 보았다"고 언급했으며, 우리 라아난은 OETA 사이의 경계가 "법적으로는 아니지만, 정치적으로 전후 정착에 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다"고 썼다.

파리 강화 회의 도중인 1919년 9월 13일, 로이드 조지는 조르주 클레망소와의 개별 회담 도중, 클레망소에게 영국 위임통치령이 "단에서 브엘세바에 이르는 고대 경계와 유사하게 정해질 것"이라고 적힌 각서를 건냈다.

The biblical concept of Eretz Israel and its re-establishment as a modern state was a basic tenet of the original Zionist program. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, presented a Zionist statement on 3 February 1919 that declared the Zionists' proposed borders and resources "essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country" including "the control of its rivers and their headwaters".틀:Bsn These borders included present day Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories, western Jordan, southwestern Syria and southern Lebanon "in the vicinity south of Sidon".틀:Bsn Neither Palestinians nor any other Arabs were involved in the discussions which determined the boundaries of Mandatory Palestine.

팔레스타인-이집트 국경

파리 강회 회의에서 영국이 처음 제안한 팔레스타인의 남쪽 국경. 이 국경은 1906년 이집트-오스만 국경을 따라 알아주라까지 간 후, 네게브까지 동서를 따라 직선으로 이어진다.

제일 먼저 정해진 국경은 영국령 이집트와의 국경이었다. 1919년 5월 9일, 파리 강화 회의에 파견된 영국 대표단의 각서에는 1906년 기준 이집트와 오스만 제국 간의 국경을 사용하려고 했다는 내용이 담겨 있으며, 결과적으로 시온주의자와 이집트 간 합의한 국경은 비교적 명확하게 정해졌다.

1922년 7월 10일 네게브 지역이 '트란스요르단에 대한 보상'으로써 팔레스타인에 추가되었다. 네게브는 보통 팔레스타인으로 보지 않았지만, 시온주의 단체에서는 팔레스타인이 홍해로 접근할 수 있어야 한다고 주장했으며, 네게브를 트란스요르단으로 편입해 달라는 1922년 및 1925년의 압둘라의 요구는 거부되었다.

북쪽 국경

위임통치령의 북쪽 국경은 다른 곳보다 정하기 더 복잡했고, 정하는 과정에도 오랜 시간이 소모되었는데, 이는 다른 국경은 영국 통치 지역 사이의 경계였지만 북쪽 국경은 프랑스와 영국 사이를 나눈 국제적인 경계였으며, 다른 지역에 비해 인구 밀도가 높아 자연적인 경계가 없는 지역을 지난다는 차이가 있었기 때문이었다.

The northern boundary between the British and French mandates was broadly defined by the Franco-British Boundary Agreement of December 1920; this became known as the Paulet–Newcombe Agreement for French Lieutenant Colonel N. Paulet and British Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Newcombe, who were appointed to lead the 1923 Boundary Commission to finalise the agreement. It placed most of the Golan Heights in the French sphere, and established a joint commission to settle and mark the border. The commission submitted its final report on 3 February 1922; it was approved with some caveats by the British and French governments on 7 March 1923, several months before Britain and France assumed their mandatory responsibilities on 29 September 1923. Under the treaty, Syrian and Lebanese residents would have the same fishing and navigation rights on Lake Hula, the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River as citizens of Mandatory Palestine, but the government of Palestine would be responsible for policing the lakes. The Zionist movement pressured the French and British to include as many water sources as possible in Palestine during the demarcating negotiations. The movement's demands influenced the negotiators, leading to the inclusion of the Sea of Galilee, both sides of the Jordan River, Lake Hula, the Dan spring, and part of the Yarmouk River. As High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel had demanded full control of the Sea of Galilee. The new border followed a 10-미터-wide (33 ft) strip along the northeastern shore. After the settlement of the northern-border issue, the British and French governments signed an agreement of good neighbourly relations between the mandated territories of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon on 2 February 1926.

팔레스타인-트란스요르단 국경

Vital Cuinet's 1896 map of the region during the late Ottoman period. The map shows the sanjaks of Hauran and Ma'an (Kerak), which formed most of what became Transjordan, and the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem and Balqa (Nablus) and Acre Sanjaks (which formed most of what became Mandatory Palestine).

The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration area, according to the British government's History of the Great War. The map shows the British-administered OETA South (consisting of the Ottoman Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem and the Nablus and Acre Sanjaks) and the Arab-administered OETA East, consisting of the Damascus Vilayet and the southern Aleppo Vilayet.

Transjordan had been part of the Syria Vilayet – primarily the sanjaks of Hauran and Ma'an (Kerak) – under the Ottomans. Since the end of the war it was part of captured territory placed under the Arab administration of OETA East, which was subsequently declared part of Faisal's Arab Kingdom of Syria. The British were content with that arrangement because Faisal was a British ally; the region fell within the indirect sphere of British influence according to the Sykes–Picot Agreement, and they did not have enough troops to garrison it.

팔레스타인과 트란스요르단 사이의 국경은 1921년 초까지도 정해지지 않았었다. 1921년 상반기 영국 내각이 만든 이 지도에는 결정되지 않은 위임통치령 간의 경계가 표시되어 있다.

Throughout the drafting of the mandate, the Zionist Organization advocated for territory east of the river to be included in Palestine. At the peace conference on 3 February 1919, the organization proposed an eastern boundary of "a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Akaba"; the railway ran parallel to, and 35–40 miles (about 60 km) east of, the Jordan River. In May, British officials presented a proposal to the peace conference which included maps showing Palestine's eastern boundary just 10 킬로미터 (6.2 mi) east of the Jordan. No agreement was reached in Paris; the topic was not discussed at the April 1920 San Remo conference, at which the boundaries of the "Palestine" and "Syria" mandates were left unspecified to "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers" at a later stage.

The Jordan River was finally chosen as the border between the two territories; this was documented in Article 25 of the mandate, approved by Curzon on 31 March 1921, which set the boundary as simply "the Jordan [river]". No further definition was discussed until mid-1922, when the boundary became significant due to negotiations on the Rutenberg hydroelectric power-plant and the Constitution of Mandatory Palestine (which did not apply to Transjordan, highlighting the need for a clear definition). The latter's publication on 1 September was the first official statement of the detailed boundary, which was repeated in a 16 September 1922 Transjordan memorandum: "from a point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of that name up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk; thence up the centre of that river to the Syrian Frontier".

트란스요르단-아라비아 국경

아카바항을 통해 트란스요르단이 내륙국이 되는 것을 막기 위해, 트란스요르단과 아라비아 간의 국경을 정하는 문제는 중요한 전략적 요소로 다루어졌다. 인구가 약 1만 명밖에 되지 않는, 남쪽의 넓은 마안-아카바 지역은 동부 OETA, 시리아 아랍 왕국, 트란스요르단 토후국이 통치했으며 헤자즈 왕국이 영유권을 주장했다. 동부 OETA에서는 파이살 1세가 마안 지역의 준총독을 임명하였으며, '다마스쿠스의 파이살과 메카의 후세인을 모두 무시한' 아카바 준총독은 후세인으로부터 통치 범위를 마안까지 확장하라는 지시를 받았다. 헤자즈 왕국은 파이살 정부가 프랑스에 패배한 후 마안 지역의 실질적 통치권을 차지할 계획이었기 때문에, 공개적인 분쟁으로 번지지는 않았다. 1925년 사우디의 헤자즈 정복 이후 후세인의 군대는 마안 지역으로 이동했으며, 이븐 사우드는 제다 조약 체결 당시 비밀 편지를 통해 압둘라의 트란스요르단의 마안 지역 통치를 인정하였다.

트란스요르단-이라크 국경

트란스요르단의 동쪽 국경은 키르쿠크-하이파 석유 파이프라인의 건설 계획과 맞물려 상당히 전략적인 문제로 간주되었다. 처음 국경이 정해진 것은 1922년 12월 2일 이라크와 네지드 간의 우콰이르 의정서로, 이라크와 네지드 간 국경의 서쪽 끝을 "북위 32도선과 동경 39도선이 만나는 지점까지"로 정하여, 트란스요르단과 이라크 간의 국경을 암시하였다. 1922년 1월 토머스 에드워드 로런스는 영국의 인도 접근성을 확보하고 이븐 사우드를 막기 위해, 두마트 알잔달까지, 와디 시르한 전체를 포함하게끔 트란스요르단을 확장해야 한다고 주장하였다..

위임통치령의 종료

팔레스타인 위임통치령

 이 부분의 본문은 팔레스타인 위임통치령의 종료입니다.

영국은 팔레스타인을 통치한 약 30년 간, 유대인과 팔레스타인 아랍인 공동체 간 시위, 폭동, 반란 등을 지속적으로 감시하였다. 1947년 11월 29일에는 유대인과 아랍인 국가 둘을 만들어 두 국가를 경제 동맹으로 묶고, 예루살렘을 유엔 신탁통치로 넘기자는, 유엔의 팔레스타인 분할안이 통과되었으며, 2주 후 영국 식민장관 아서 크리치 존스는 영국 위임통치령이 1948년 5월 15일 종료될 것이라고 발표하였다. 위임통치령 마지막 날에는 이스라엘 독립 선언서가 발표되었으며, 제1차 중동 전쟁이 발발하였다.

트란스요르단 토후국

 이 부분의 본문은 트란스요르단 토후국입니다.

위임통치령이 발효되기 5달 전인 1923년 4월, 영국은 트란스요르단에 '독립 정부'를 인정하겠다는 의사를 발표하였다. 트란스요르단은 1928년 2월 20일 합의를 통해 영국의 감독 하에서 높은 자치권을 보장받았고, 1946년 3월 22일 조약을 통해 완전한 독립을 얻었다.

위임통치령이 발효되기까지의 주요 연표

			행정부
연도	일자	문서	팔레스타인	트란스요르단
전쟁 전			오스만 산자크: 예루살렘, 나블루스, 아크레	오스만 산자크: 하우란, 마안
1915	10월 24일	후세인-맥마흔 서한
1916	1월 3일	사이크스–피코 협정
1917	11월 2일	밸푸어 선언
1918	10월 23일		영국 통치 하의 남부 OETA 선포	아랍-영국 통치 하의 동부 OETA 선포
	12월 1일	프랑스의 팔레스타인 영토 포기
1919	6월 28일	위임통치령을 포함한 국제연맹 규약 제정
1920	1월 10일	국제연맹 규약 시행
	3월 8일			시리아 아랍 왕국 선포
	4월 25일	산레모 회담에서의 위임통치령 할당
	7월 1일		고등판무관 임명에 따른 민간 통치 개시
	7월 23일			마이살룬 전투 이후 무인지대가 됨
	8월 10일	세브르 조약 체결
	11–26 August			커즌의 정책: "그 지역에 어떠한 영국 행정부를 설치하는 데 의심의 여지가 없어야 한다"
	21 November			압둘라 1세의 군대가 트란스요르단 남부로 진입
	12월 7일	First draft submitted to the League of Nations
	12월 23일	Agreement on northern boundary
1921	12–30 March	Cairo conference. Article 25 (Transjordan) drafted		트란스요르단 지역을 별도의 아랍 독립체로서 팔레스타인 위임통치령에 추가하자는 의견 제시
	4월 11일			트란스요르단 토후국 성립
1922	24 July	Mandate terms approved
	10 August		Palestine constitution signed
	16 September	트란스요르단 각서 승인
	23 October		1922년 팔레스타인 인구 조사
1923	25 April			독립 선언
	29 September	위임통치령의 발효

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• Sykes, Christopher (1973). 《Crossroads to Israel》. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-20165-2. 
• Teitelbaum, Joshua (2001). 《The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia》. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 978-1-85065-460-5. 
• Wilson, Mary Christina (1990). 《King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan》. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-39987-6. 
• Wright, Quincy (1930). 《Mandates Under the League of Nations》. University of Chicago Press. OCLC 562719723. 
• Wright, Esmond (1951). “Abdallah's Jordan: 1947–1951”. 《Middle East Journal》 5: 439–460. 
• Zander, Walter (1973). “On the Settlement of Disputes About the Christian Holy Places”. 《Israel Law Review》 8 (3): 331–366. doi:10.1017/S0021223700004258. S2CID 149471783. 
• Zieger, Robert H. (2001). 《America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience》. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-8476-9645-1. 

일반 역사

• Hurewitz, J. C. (1979년 6월 1일). 《The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record – British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945》. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-02203-2. 
• Rogan, Eugene (2015). 《The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 1914-1920》. Penguin Books Limited. ISBN 978-0-14-196870-4. 
• Wasserstein, Bernard (2008). 《Israel and Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?》. Profile Books. ISBN 978-1-84668-092-2. 

이해관계 하의 단체 또는 개인의 작품

• Bentwich, Norman (1932). 《England in Palestine》. K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company Limited. 
• Bentwich, Norman (1929). “The Mandate for Transjordan”. 《British Yearbook of International Law》 (Humphrey Sumner Milford) 10: 212–213. 
• Chamberlain, Austen (1924), 《Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain; Treaty Series No. 728》, United States Government Printing Office 
• Council of Four (1919), 〈The Council of Four: minutes of meetings March 20 to May 24, 1919〉, 《Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919》 V, United States Government Printing Office 
• Council of Heads of Delegations (1919), 〈The Council of Heads of Delegations: minutes of meetings August 29 to November 5, 1919〉, 《Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919》, United States Government Printing Office 
• Council of Ten (1919), 〈The council of ten: minutes of meetings January 12 to February 14, 1919〉, 《Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919》 III, United States Government Printing Office 
• ESCO Foundation (1947), 《Palestine – A Study Of Jewish Arab And British Policies》 I, Yale University Press, OCLC 459549878 
• Lausanne Conference (1923), 《Cmd. 1814, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922–1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace》, HMSO 
• Macmunn, G. F.; Falls, C. (1930). 《Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine, From June 1917 to the End of the War Part II》. History of the Great War based on Official Documents by Direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence II. accompanying Map Case 1판. London: HMSO. OCLC 656066774. 
• Palestine Royal Commission (1937), 《Cmd. 5479, Palestine Royal Commission Report, also known as the "Peel Report"》 (PDF), HMSO, For further information see the Commission's Wikipedia article at Peel Commission 
• UN Division for Palestinian Rights (1978), 〈Part I〉, 《The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem》, United Nations, online and in pdf form 
• Weizmann, Chaim (1949). 《Trial and Error, The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann》. Jewish Publication Society of America. OCLC 830295337. 
• Woodward, Ernest Llewellyn (1952). 《Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First series, Volume IV》. H.M. Stationery Office. 
• Woodward, Ernest Llewellyn (1963). 《Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First series, Volume XIII》. H.M. Stationery Office. 
• Zionist Organisation (1921). 〈Political Report〉. 《Extracts from the reports of the executive of the Zionist Organisation to the twelfth Zionist Congress, Carlsbad, September, 1921》. Zionist Organisation. 
• Zionist Organization (1922). 《Report of the Twelfth Zionist Congress: Held at Carlsbad, September 1st to 14th 1921》. Central Office of the Zionist Organization. ; original German transcript at 《Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 12. Zionisten-Kongresses in Karlsbad vom 1. bis 14. September 1921》 [Proceedings of the 12th Zionist Congress September 1 to 14, 1921 in Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary)]. 《sammlungen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de》 (독일어) (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag). 1922. 279쪽. ZDB 2176334-3. 

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