사용자:Pectus Solentis/작업실/마음 이론

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

마음 이론은 자신과 타인의 정신적 상태 — 신념, 의도, 욕구, 연기, 지식 등등 — 를 이해하고 다른 사람이 자기 자신과 다른 신념, 욕망, 의도를 갖고 있음을 이해하는 능력을 말한다.[1] 이런 질문에 대해서는 철학적으로 접근하는 경우가 잇기는 하지만, 이런 의미에서의 '마음 이론'은 마음에 대한 철학과는 다르다.

마음 이론의 정의[편집]

마음 이론을 '이론'이라고 부르는 것은, 마음을 직접적으로 관찰할 수 없다는 사실 때문이다.[1] 다른 사람들도 마음을 가지고 있을 것이란 가정은 '마음 이론'이라고 불리는데, 각각의 사람들은 오로지 내성(內省)을 통해서만 자신의 마음이 존재한다는 것을 느낄 수 있고, 어떤 사람도 다른 사람의 마음을 직접적으로 느낄 수 없기 때문이다. 이 '이론'에서는, 다른 사람들은 자기 자신의 그것과 비슷한 마음을 가진다고 가정되며, 이 '이론'의 형성은 사회적 상호작용의 쌍방통행적 특성에 기초한다. 다른 사람과 주의를 공유하기,[2] 의사소통의 목적으로 언어를 사용하기,[3] 다른 사람의 감정과 행동을 이해하기 등등.[4] 마음 이론을 갖고 있는 사람들은 다른 사람들의 행동을 예측 또는 설명하고, 다른 사람의 의도를 받아들이기 위해 다른 사람이 갖고 있는 생각, 소망, 의도를 추정할 수 있다. 맨 처음에 정의된대로, 마음 이론을 갖고 있는 사람들은 누군가의 정신적 상태가 다른 사람의 행동에 의해서 발생함을 이해할 수 있다. (그로써 다른 사람들의 행동을 설명하고 에측할 수 있다)[1] 다른 사람의 정신 상태를 추론할 수 있고 그것이 다른 사람을 행동하게 만든다는 것을 이해한다면, 부분적으로는, 사람들은 마음이 표현을 만들어낸다는 것을 당연히 이해할 수 있을 것이다.[5][6] 어떤 사람이 완벽하게 작동하지 않는 마음 이론을 갖고 있다면, 그것은 그 사람이 인지장애 혹은 발달장애를 갖고 있다는 뜻일 수 있다.

마음 이론은 인간이 기본적으로 가지고 있는 이론인 것으로 보이지만, 여러 해에 걸쳐 사회적인 혹은 다른 경험을 축적해야 완성되는 것으로 알려져 있다. 사람들은 각각 자신의, 더 효과적으로 작동할 수도 있고 덜 효과적으로 작동할 수도 있는, 마음 이론을 개발할 수 있다. 교감과 관련된 개념인데, 이는 보통 신념, 열망, 혹은 다른 사람의 감정 상태와 같은 것을 경험에 바탕해서 인식하고 이해하는 것을 의미한다. 주로 역지사지라고 부르는 그것 말이다. 최근의 신경동물행동학 연구에 따르면, 심지어 설치류들도 윤리적인 혹은 다른 개체와 교감하는 행동을 할 수 있을 가능성이 있다고 한다[7]. Neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development maintain that theory of mind is a byproduct of a broader hypercognitive ability of the human mind to register, monitor, and represent its own functioning.[8]

Premack과 Woodruff의 "침팬지에게도 마음 이론이 있는가?"라는 논문 뒤로,[9] 거의 30년동안 여러 다른 대상들(인간/동물, 어른/아이, 정상인/발달장애인)에 대한 마음 이론 연구와 마음 이론의 이론 연구는 급속도로 증가하고 있다. The emerging field of social neuroscience has also begun to address this debate, by imaging humans while performing tasks demanding the understanding of an intention, belief or other mental state.

An alternative account of theory of mind (ToM) is given within operant psychology and provides significant empirical evidence for a functional account of both perspective taking and empathy. The most developed operant approach is founded on research on derived relational responding and is subsumed within what is called, "Relational Frame Theory." According to this view empathy and perspective taking comprise a complex set of derived relational abilities based on learning to discriminate and verbally respond to ever more complex relations between self, others, place, and time, and the transformation of function through established relations.[10][11]

철학적 뿌리[편집]

ToM에 대한 이 시대의 논의는 철학적인 토론에 뿌리를 두고 있다. — 가장 넓게 범위를 짚자면, 르네 데카르트가 "제1 철학에 관한 성찰"을 출판함으로써 마음에 대해서 과학적으로 연구할 기틀을 잡은 때부터. Most prominent recently are two contrasting approaches, in the philosophical literature, to theory of mind: theory-theory and simulation theory. The theory-theorist imagines a veritable theory—"folk psychology"—used to reason about others' minds. The theory is developed automatically and innately, though instantiated through social interactions.[12]

다른 한편으로는, simulation theory suggests ToM is not, at its core, theoretical. Two kinds of simulationism have been proposed.[13] One version (Alvin Goldman's) emphasizes that one must recognize one's own mental states before ascribing mental states to others by simulation. The second version of simulation theory proposes that each person comes to know his or her own and others' minds through what Robert Gordon[13] names a logical "ascent routine" which answers questions about mental states by re-phrasing the question as a metaphysical one. For example, if Zoe asks Pam, "Do you think that dog wants to play with you?", Pam would ask herself, "Does that dog want to play with me?" to determine her own response. She could equally well ask that to answer the question of what Zoe might think. Both hold that people generally understand one another by simulating being in the other's shoes.

One of the differences between the two theories that have influenced psychological consideration of ToM is that theory-theory describes ToM as a detached theoretical process that is an innate feature, whereas simulation theory portrays ToM as a kind of knowledge that allows one to form predictions of someone's mental states by putting oneself in the other person's shoes and simulating them. These theories continue to inform the definitions of theory of mind at the heart of scientific ToM investigation.

The philosophical roots of the Relational Frame Theory account of ToM arise from contextual psychology and refer to the study of organisms (both human and non-human) interacting in and with a historical and current situational context. It is an approach based on contextualism, a philosophy in which any event is interpreted as an ongoing act inseparable from its current and historical context and in which a radically functional approach to truth and meaning is adopted. As a variant of contextualism, RFT focuses on the construction of practical, scientific knowledge. This scientific form of contextual psychology is virtually synonymous with the philosophy of operant psychology.[14]

마음 이론의 발달[편집]

The study of which animals are capable of attributing knowledge and mental states to others, as well as when in human ontogeny and phylogeny this ability developed, has identified a number of precursory behaviors to a theory of mind. Understanding attention, understanding of others' intentions, and imitative experience with other people are hallmarks of a theory of mind which may be observed early in the development of what will later become a full-fledged theory. In studies with non-human animals and pre-verbal humans, in particular, researchers look to these behaviors preferentially in making inferences about mind.

Baron-Cohen[누가?] identified the infant's understanding of attention in others, a social skill found by 7 to 9 months of age, as a "critical precursor" to the development of theory of mind.[2] Understanding attention involves understanding that seeing can be directed selectively as attention, that the looker assesses the seen object as "of interest," and that seeing can induce beliefs. Attention can be directed and shared by the act of pointing, a joint attention behavior which requires taking into account another person's mental state, particularly whether the person notices an object or finds it of interest. Baron-Cohen speculates that the inclination to spontaneously reference an object in the world as of interest ("proto-declarative pointing") and to likewise appreciate the directed attention and interests of another may be the underlying motive behind all human communication.[2]

Understanding of others' intentions is another critical precursor to understanding other minds because intentionality, or "aboutness", is a fundamental feature of mental states and events. The "intentional stance" has been defined by Dennett[누가?][15] as an understanding that others' actions are goal-directed and arise from particular beliefs or desires. Both 2- and 3-year-old children could discriminate when an experimenter intentionally vs. accidentally marked a box as baited with stickers.[16] Even earlier in ontogeny, Andrew N. Meltzoff found that 18 month-old infants could perform target manipulations that adult experimenters attempted and failed, suggesting the infants could represent the object-manipulating behavior of adults as involving goals and intentions.[17] While attribution of intention (the box-marking) and knowledge (false-belief tasks) is investigated in young humans and nonhuman animals to detect precursors to a theory of mind, Gagliardi[누가?] et al. have pointed out that even adult humans do not always act in a way consistent with an attributional perspective.[18] In the experiment, adult human subjects came to make choices about baited containers when guided by confederates who could not see (and therefore, not know) which container had been baited.

Recent research in developmental psychology suggests that the infant's ability to imitate others lies at the origins of both a theory of mind and other social-cognitive achievements like perspective-taking and empathy.[19] According to Meltzoff, the infant's innate understanding that others are "like me" allows it to recognize the equivalence between the physical and mental states apparent in others and those felt by the self. For example, the infant uses his own experiences orienting his head/eyes toward an object of interest to understand the movements of others who turn toward an object, that is, that they will generally attend to objects of interest or significance. Some researchers in comparative disciplines have hesitated to put a too-ponderous weight on imitation as a critical precursor to advanced human social-cognitive skills like mentalizing and empathizing, especially if true imitation is no longer employed by adults. A test of imitation by Horowitz[누가?][20] found that adult subjects imitated an experimenter demonstrating a novel task far less closely than children subjects did. Horowitz points out that the precise psychological state underlying imitation is unclear and cannot, by itself, be used to draw conclusions about the mental states of humans.

경험적 조사[편집]

3-4세 미만의 아동이 마음 이론을 가지고 있는지 여부는 연구자들 사이에서 현재 토론되고 있는 주제이다. 이는 쉽지 않은 문제인데, 언어를 배우기 전의 아동이 다른 사람과 세상을 이해하고 있는지 아닌지를 평가하는 것은 어려운 일이기 때문이다. ToM의 발달을 연구하는 실험에는 말을 배우기 전의 아동의 umwelt — (독일어의 Umwelt라는 단어는 "환경" 또는 "주변의 세상"을 의미한다) — 를 반드시 고려에 넣어야 한다.

'틀린 믿음' 실험[편집]

ToM 발달에서 가장 중요한 기념비적 사건 중 하나는 사람들이 틀린 믿음을 가질 수 있다는 것을 이해하는 것이다. 그러니까, 다른 사람들은 세상에 대해서 자신과 다른 생각을 할 수 있다는 것을 이해하는 것 말이다. 그것을 위해서는, 지식이 어떻게 형성되는지와, 사람들의 신념은 그들의 지식에 바탕한다는 것, 그리고 그런 정신적 상태는 현실과는 다를 수 있다는 것, 그리고 사람들의 행동은 그들의 정신적 상태에 의해서 결정된다는 것을 이해해야 한다고 생각된다. 여러 가지 형태의 '틀린 믿음' 실험이 개발되어 있는데, 그것들은 Wimmer and Perner (1983) 에 의해 개발된 실험에 바탕을 두고 있다.[21]

(자주 샐리와 앤 실험으로 불리는) 가장 일반적인 형태의 실험에서는, 아이들에게 두 명의 등장인물이 등장하는 이야기를 들려준다. 한 가지 예로, 두 아이들에게 샐리와 앤이라는 이름이 붙은 두 인형을 보여주는데, 그 인형은 각각 바구니를 하나씩 갖고 있다. 샐리는 공깃돌도 갖고 있는데, 샐리는 그것을 자기 바구니에 넣고 산책을 하러 나간다. 샐리가 방에서 나가면, 앤은 공깃돌을 바구니에서 꺼내서 상자 안에 넣는다. 샐리가 돌아오면 샐리는 어디에서 공깃돌을 찾겠냐고, 아이에게 질문한다. 샐리가 (자기가 맨 처음에 공깃돌을 넣었던) 바구니를 뒤질 것이라고 말한다면 아이는 실험에서 통과한다. 샐리가 상자를 뒤질 것이라고 말한다면 아이는 실험에서 실패한다. 이야기를 듣는 아이는 공깃돌이 어디 있는지 알지만, 샐리는 앤이 공깃돌을 옮기는 장면을 보지 못했기 때문에 공깃돌이 바구니에 없다는 것을 모르는 것이다. 이 실험을 통과하기 위해서, 아이들은 다른 사람이 세상을 이해하는 정신적 상태가 그들 자신의 것과 다르다는 것을 알아야 하며, 그런 정신적 상태에 기반해 그 사람이 어떤 행동을 할 것인지를 예측할 수 있어야 한다. '틀린 믿음' 실험을 이용한 연구는 아주 일관된 결과를 보여주었다. 발달장애가 없는 대부분의 아동은 만 4세 근처에 도달하기 전까지는 이 실험을 통과하지 못했다. (주목할 것이 있는데, 한 연구에서는 다운 증후군 아이를 포함한 대부분의 아이들은 이 실험을 통과할 수 있었지만, 자폐증 진단을 받은 아이의 80%는 이 실험을 통과할 수 없었다.)[22]

'겉보기와 실제' 실험[편집]

'틀린 밀음' 실험에 내재되어 있는 문제를 해결하기 위해, 다른 실험 기법이 개발되었다. "겉보기와 실제", 혹은 "스마티"[23] 실험에서, 실험자는 피실험자인 아이에게 "스마티"라고 불리는 사탕의 상자처럼 생긴 상자 안에 무엇이 들어 있는지 추측해 보라고 한다. (일반적으로) 아이들은 그 안에 스마티가 들어 있을 것이라고 생각하는데, 실제로 그 안에는 스마티가 아니라 연필이 들어 있다. 이제 실험자는 상자를 다시 닫고, 그 아이에게 상자의 내용물을 보지 못한 다른 사람이라면 그 상자 안에 무엇이 들어 있다고 생각할 것인지를 물어 본다. 다른 사람들이라면 그 상자 안에 스마티가 들어 있을 것이라고 생각한다고 아이가 말한다면 그 아이는 이 실험을 통과한 것이다. 다른 사람들이라면 그 상자 안에 연필가 들어 있을 것이라고 생각한다고 아이가 말한다면 그 아이는 이 실험을 실패한 것이다. Gopnik & Astington (1988) 는, 4-5세 아이들은 이 실험을 통과한다는 것을 알아냈다.

다른 실험들[편집]

"가짜 사진" 실험[24][25]은 마음 이론 발달을 측정하는 데 쓰일 수 있는 또 다른 실험이다. 이 실험에서, 아이들은 실제의 상태와 사진 속의 모습이 다르게 나타날 수 있다는 것을 이해해야 한다. '가짜 사진' 실험에서는, 사진에 찍혀야 할 장소나 물건 등이 사진을 찍기 전과 후의 모습이 다르다.[26] 장소 바꾸기 실험에서, 아이들은 한 아이가 어떤 장소에 어떤 물체를 갖다놓고 있는데 (예 : 녹색 컵받침 위에 초콜릿을 올려놓는 등) 누군가가 그 장면을 폴라로이드 사진기로 찍고 있다는 이야기를 듣는다. 사진이 현상되고 있는 중에, 그 물체는 다른 장소로 (예 : 파란 컵받침으로) 옮겨진다. 그 때, 아이에게 대조군으로 2개의 질문을 던진다. "우리가 사진을 맨 처음 찍었을 때, 그 물건은 어디에 있엇지요? 그리고 지금은 그 물건이 어디에 있지요?" 그리고 그 아이에게 '가짜 사진 질문'을 던진다. "사진 속에서 그 물건은 어디에 있을까요?" 아이가 그 물체의 실제 위치와 사진 속에서의 그 물체의 위치를 전부 똑바로 대답하면 이 실험에 통과한다.

어린 아이나 인간이 아닌 동물, 그리고 자폐인들에게 이 실험을 더 쉽게 이해할 수 있게 하기 위해, 마음 이론 연구에서는 언어를 통하지 않는 실험 기법을 개발하고 있다. 이런 실험 기법 중의 하나는 아이가 무엇을 보는 것을 더 선호하는지를 측정하는데, 각각의 물체를 보는 시간을 종속변수로 재는 방법을 쓴다. 예를 들어, Woodward는 9개월 아기가, 손처럼 생긴 살아있지 않은 물체가 하는 행동보다는 사람의 손이 하는 행동을 보는 것을 더 좋아함을 밝혀냈다. 다른 형태의 실험에서는 모방 행동의 빈도, 목표가 있는 아직 완성되지 않은 행동을 따라하고 완수할 수 있는 능력,[17] 가장 놀이를 하는 빈도 등을 측정한다.[27]

마음 이론의 결여[편집]

마음 이론(ToM)이 결여되어 있다면 타인의 관점을 이해하는 데 어려움을 겪을 것이라고 예상할 수 있다. 이런 상태를 마음맹이라고 부르기도 한다. 그러니까, ToM이 결여되어 있는 사람들은 자기 자신의 관점 이외의 다른 어떤 관점으로도 사물을 볼 때 어려움을 겪는다는 이야기이다.[28] 마음 이론이 결여되어 있는 사람들은 다른 사람들의 의도를 읽어내는 것에 어려움을 겪고, 사람들의 행동이 다른 사람들에게 어떤 방식으로 영향을 미치는지를 이해할 수 없고, 사회적 상호작용에서 어려움을 겪게 된다.[29] ToM의 결여는 자폐 스펙트럼 장애인들과 정신분열증 환자, 주의력 결핍 장애인, 알콜과 마약의 영향에 있는 사람들, 잠을 자지 못한 사람들, 심각한 감정적 / 신체적 고통을 겪고 있는 사람들에게서 관찰되었다.

자폐증[편집]

1985년에, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie, Uta Frith는 자폐증 어린이들이 ToM을 갖고 있지 않고 있음을 암시한 연구 논문을 출판했다.[22] 그리고 자폐증 어린이들인 다른 사람의 믿음을 이해해야 하는 일에서 특히 어려움을 겪을 것임을 암시했다. 그 아이들이 언어적 기술을 배울 때 이러한 어려움은 계속해서 나타났고 (Happe, 1995, Child Development) 이것은 자폐증의 핵심적인 상태로서 다뤄졌다.

많은 사람들은, 자폐증을 갖고 있는 것이 다른 사람의 마음 상태를 이해하는 데 아주 강한 어려움을 겪고 있으며, 자페증 환자들은 마음 이론을 만들어 낼 능력이 없다고 생각해 왔다.[30] 자폐증과 마음 이론의 관계를 연구하던 연구자들은 이 둘의 관계를 다양한 방법으로 설명하려고 시도했다. 어떤 설명에서는 마음 이론이 다른 사람의 마음 상태를 이해하고 어린 시절에 가장놀이를 하는 것에 영향을 준다고 가정한다.[31] Leslie에 따르면,[31] 마음 이론은 사고와 믿음, 열망을, 주변 환경이 실제든지 아니든지 정신적으로 표현할 수 있는 능력이다. 자폐증 환자들이 마음 이론과 가장 놀이 모두에서 극도의 어려움을 겪는 이유를 이것으로 설명할 수 있을지도 모른다. 그런데, Hobson은 사회적/정서적으로 이것을 설명하는 가설을 만들었다. [32] 자폐증을 가진 사람들은 타인의 감정을 이해하고 적절히 반응하는 능력이 결여되어 있기 때문에 마음 이론이 결여된다는 것이다. 그는 일반적으로 발달하는 인간들은, 자폐증을 가진 인간과는 달리, 나중에 다른 사람들의 감정을 이해하고 그에 맞게 반응할 수 있는 몇 가지 기술을 가지고 태어나는 것이 아닌가 하고 추정한다. 다른 학자들은 자폐증이 특정한 발달상의 지연을 불러오고, 각자 다른 성장 단계에서 어려움을 겪을 수 있기 때문에, 이런 결여를 갖고 있는 아이들이 실제로 나타내는 손상의 양상은 다양할 수 있다고 주장한다. 삶의 극초기에 존재했던 장애가 나중에 타인과 주의를 공유하는 행동을 발달시키는 과정에사 문제를 일으킬 수 있고, 그로써 완전한 ToM을 만들어내는 것을 방해할 수 있다는 것이다.[30]

예전까지는 ToM이 완전히 있거나 완전히 없거나 한 상태로 존재할 것이라고 생각해 왔던 것과는 달리, 실제로 ToM은 그 두 가지 상태의 연속선상에 존재할 것으로 예측되고 있다[27]. 어떤 연구 결과에서는 어떤 자폐증 사람들은 다른 사람의 마음을 이해하는 것이 불가능할 것이라고 추정했지만,[2] 최근에는 이들 역시 사람들의 마음을 읽는 것을 가능하게 할 수 있다는 증거들이 발견되고 있다.[33]

뇌의 구조[편집]

정상적인 발달과정을 거치는 인간[편집]

Research on theory of mind in autism led to the view that mentalizing abilities are subserved by dedicated mechanisms that can (in some cases) be impaired while general cognitive function remains largely intact. Neuroimaging research has supported this view, demonstrating specific brain regions consistently engaged during theory of mind tasks. Early PET research on theory of mind, using verbal and pictorial story comprehension tasks, identified a set of regions including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and area around posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and sometimes precuneus and amygdala/temporopolar cortex (reviewed in[34]). Subsequently, research on the neural basis of theory of mind has diversified, with separate lines of research focused on the understanding of beliefs, intentions, and more complex properties of minds such as psychological traits.

Studies from Rebecca Saxe's lab at MIT, using a false belief versus false photograph task contrast aimed to isolate the mentalizing component of the false belief task, have very consistently found activation in mPFC, precuneus, and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), right-lateralized.[35][36] In particular, it has been proposed that the right TPJ (rTPJ) is selectively involved in representing the beliefs of others.[37] However, some debate exists, as some scientists have noted that the same rTPJ region has been consistently activated during spatial reorienting of visual attention;[38][39] Jean Decety from the University of Chicago and Jason Mitchell from Harvard have thus proposed that the rTPJ subserves a more general function involved in both false belief understanding and attentional reorienting, rather than a mechanism specialized for social cognition. However, it is possible that the observation of overlapping regions for representing beliefs and attentional reorienting may simply be due to adjacent but distinct neuronal populations that code for each. The resolution of typical fMRI studies may not be good enough to show that distinct/adjacent neuronal populations code for each of these processes. In a study following Decety and Mitchell, Saxe and colleagues used higher-resolution fMRI and showed that the peak of activation for attentional reorienting is approximately 6-10mm above the peak for representing beliefs. Further corroborating that differing populations of neurons may code for each process, they found no similarity in the patterning of fMRI response across space[40].

Functional imaging has also been used to study the detection of mental state information in Heider-Simmel-esque animations of moving geometric shapes, which typical humans automatically perceive as social interactions laden with intention and emotion. Three studies found remarkably similar patterns of activation during the perception of such animations versus a random or deterministic motion control: mPFC, pSTS, fusiform face area (FFA), and amygdala were selectively engaged during the ToM condition.[41][42][43] Another study presented subjects with an animation of two dots moving with a parameterized degree of intentionality (quantifying the extent to which the dots chased each other), and found that pSTS activation correlated with this parameter.[44]

A separate body of research has implicated the posterior superior temporal sulcus in the perception of intentionality in human action; this area is also involved in perceiving biological motion, including body, eye, mouth, and point-light display motion (reviewed in[45]). One study found increased pSTS activation while watching a human lift his hand versus having his hand pushed up by a piston (intentional versus unintentional action).[46] Several studies have found increased pSTS activation when subjects perceive a human action that is incongruent with the action expected from the actor’s context and inferred intention: for instance, a human performing a reach-to-grasp motion on empty space next to an object, versus grasping the object;[47] a human shifting eye gaze toward empty space next to a checkerboard target versus shifting gaze toward the target;[48] an unladen human turning on a light with his knee, versus turning on a light with his knee while carrying a pile of books;[49] and a walking human pausing as he passes behind a bookshelf, versus walking at a constant speed.[50] In these studies, actions in the "congruent" case have a straightforward goal, and are easy to explain in terms of the actor’s intention; the incongruent actions, on the other hand, require further explanation (why would someone twist empty space next to a gear?), and apparently demand more processing in the STS. Note that this region is distinct from the temporo-parietal area activated during false belief tasks.[50] Also note that pSTS activation in most of the above studies was largely right-lateralized, following the general trend in neuroimaging studies of social cognition and perception: also right-lateralized are the TPJ activation during false belief tasks, the STS response to biological motion, and the FFA response to faces.

Neuropsychological evidence has provided support for neuroimaging results on the neural basis of theory of mind. A study with patients suffering from a lesion of the temporoparietal junction of the brain (between the temporal lobe and parietal lobe) reported that they have difficulty with some theory of mind tasks.[51] This shows that theory of mind abilities are associated with specific parts of the human brain. However, the fact that the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction are necessary for theory of mind tasks does not imply that these regions are specific to that function.[38][52] TPJ and mPFC may subserve more general functions necessary for ToM.

Research by Vittorio Gallese, Luciano Fadiga and Giacomo Rizzolatti (reviewed in[53]) has shown that some sensorimotor neurons, which are referred to as mirror neurons, first discovered in the premotor cortex of rhesus monkeys, may be involved in action understanding. Single-electrode recording revealed that these neurons fired when a monkey performed an action and when the monkey viewed another agent carrying out the same task. Similarly, fMRI studies with human participants have shown brain regions (assumed to contain mirror neurons) are active when one person sees another person's goal-directed action.[54] These data have led some authors to suggest that mirror neurons may provide the basis for theory of mind in the brain, and to support simulation theory of mind reading (see above).[55]

However, there is also evidence against the link between mirror neurons and theory of mind. First, macaque monkeys have mirror neurons but do not seem to have a 'human-like' capacity to understand theory of mind and belief. Second, fMRI studies of theory of mind typically report activation in the mPFC, temporal poles and TPJ or STS,[56] but these brain areas are not part of the mirror neuron system. Some investigators, like developmental psychologist Andrew Meltzoff and neuroscientist Jean Decety, believe that mirror neurons merely facilitate learning through imitation and may provide a precursor to the development of ToM.[57][58] Others, like philosopher Shaun Gallagher, suggest that mirror-neuron activation, on a number of counts, fails to meet the definition of simulation as proposed by the simulation theory of mindreading.[59][60]

자폐증의 경우[편집]

신경 촬영법을 활용한 몇몇 연구에서, 아스퍼거 증후군과 고기능 자폐증(HFA)을 앓고 있는 사람들은 신경 구조적인 문제로 마음 이론을 결여한 경우가 있다는 것이 밝혀졌다. 자폐증 환자의 마음 이론에 대한 최초의 PET(positron emission tomography : 양전자 방사 단층 사진) 최초의 신경 이미지 연구 using a task-induced activation paradigm in autism 이기도 한 연구에서는 앞에서 정상인들에게 했던 연구[61]와 똑같은 이야기 이해 실험을 수행했다.[62] This study found displaced and diminished mPFC activation in subjects with autism. 하지만, 그 연구에서는 단 6명의 자폐인만을 대상으로 삼았고, PET 사진의 3차원적 해상도가 상대적으로 떨어졋기 때문에, 이에 대해서는 후속 연구가 속행되어야 할 것이다.

A subsequent fMRI study scanned normally developing adults and adults with HFA while performing a "reading the mind in the eyes" task—viewing a photo of a human’s eyes and choosing which of two adjectives better describes the person’s mental state, versus a gender discrimination control.[63] The authors found activity in orbitofrontal cortex, STS, and amygdala in normal subjects, and found no amygdala activation and abnormal STS activation in subjects with autism.

A more recent PET study looked at brain activity in individuals with HFA and Asperger syndrome while viewing Heider-Simmel animations (see above) versus a random motion control.[64] In contrast to normally developing subjects, those with autism showed no STS or FFA activation, and significantly less mPFC and amygdala activation. Activity in extrastriate regions V3 and LO was identical across the two groups, suggesting intact lower-level visual processing in the subjects with autism. The study also reported significantly less functional connectivity between STS and V3 in the autism group. Note, however, that decreased temporal correlation between activity in STS and V3 would be expected simply from the lack of an evoked response in STS to intent-laden animations in subjects with autism; a more informative analysis would be to compute functional connectivity after regressing out evoked responses from all time series.

A subsequent study, using the incongruent/congruent gaze shift paradigm described above, found that in high-functioning adults with autism, posterior STS (pSTS) activation was undifferentiated while watching a human shift gaze toward a target and toward adjacent empty space.[65] The lack of additional STS processing in the incongruent state may suggest that these subjects fail to form an expectation of what the actor should do given contextual information, or that information about the violation of this expectation doesn’t reach STS; both explanations involve an impairment in the ability to link eye gaze shifts with intentional explanations. This study also found a significant anticorrelation between STS activation in the incongruent-congruent contrast and social subscale score on the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised, but not scores on the other subscales.

In 2011, an fMRI study demonstrated that right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) of higher-functioning adults with autism was not selectively activated more for mentalizing judgments when compared to physical judgments about self and other[66]. rTPJ selectivity for mentalizing was also related to individual variation on clinical measures of social impairment; individuals whose rTPJ was increasingly more active for mentalizing compared to physical judgments were less socially impaired, while those who showed little to no difference in response to mentalizing or physical judgments were the most socially impaired. This evidence builds on work in typical development that suggests rTPJ is critical for representing mental state information, irrespective of whether it is about oneself or others. It also points to an explanation at the neural level for the pervasive mind-blindness difficulties in autism that are evident throughout the lifespan[67].

인간이 아닌 생물체의 마음 이론[편집]

As the title of Premack and Woodruff's 1978 article "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" indicates, it is also important to ask if other animals besides humans have a genetic endowment and social environment that allows them to acquire a theory of mind in the same way that human children do. This is a contentious issue because of the problem of inferring from animal behavior the existence of thinking, of the existence of a concept of self or self-awareness, or of particular thoughts. One difficulty with non-human studies of ToM is the lack of sufficient numbers of naturalistic observation, giving insight into what the evolutionary pressures might be on a species' development of theory of mind.

Non-human research still has a major place in this field, however, and is especially useful in illuminating which nonverbal behaviors signify components of theory of mind, and in pointing to possible stepping points in the evolution of what many claim to be a uniquely human aspect of social cognition. While it is difficult to study human-like theory of mind and mental states in species whose potential mental states we have an incomplete understanding, researchers can focus on simpler components of more complex capabilities. For example, many researchers focus on animals' understanding of intention, gaze, perspective, or knowledge (or rather, what another being has seen). Call and Tomasello's study[16] that looked at understanding of intention in orangutans, chimpanzees and children showed that all three species understood the difference between accidental and intentional acts. Part of the difficulty in this line of research is that observed phenomena can often be explained as simple stimulus-response learning, as it is in the nature of any theorizers of mind to have to extrapolate internal mental states from observable behavior. Recently, most non-human theory of mind research has focused on monkeys and great apes, who are of most interest in the study of the evolution of human social cognition. Other studies relevant to attributions theory of mind have been conducted using plovers[68] and dogs,[69] and have shown preliminary evidence of understanding attention—one precursor of theory of mind—in others.

There has been some controversy over the interpretation of evidence purporting to show theory of mind ability—or inability—in animals. Two examples serve as demonstration: first, Povinelli et al. (1990)[70] presented chimpanzees with the choice of two experimenters from which to request food: one who had seen where food was hidden, and one who, by virtue of one of a variety of mechanisms (having a bucket or bag over his head; a blindfold over his eyes; or being turned away from the baiting) does not know, and can only guess. They found that the animals failed in most cases to differentially request food from the "knower." By contrast, Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2001)[71] found that subordinate chimpanzees were able to use the knowledge state of dominant rival chimpanzees to determine which container of hidden food they approached.

같이 보기[편집]

주석[편집]

  1. ↑ 가 나 다 Premack, D. G. & Woodruff, G. (1978). 침팬지에게 마음 이론이 있는가? 인지과학 및 뇌과학, 1, 515-526.
  2. ↑ 가 나 다 라 Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). Precursors to a theory of mind: Understanding attention in others. In A. Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and simulation of everyday mindreading (pp. 233-251). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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  23. ↑ 영국에서 팔리는 사탕의 일종
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  28. ↑ Moore, S. (2002). 《아스퍼거 증후군과 초등학교 생활》. Shawnee Mission, KS: Autism Asperger Publishing Company. 
  29. ↑ Baker, J. (2003). 《사회적 기술 훈련 : 아스퍼거 증후군과 사회적 커뮤니케이션 문제를 겪고 있는 어린이와 청소년을 위해》. Mission, KS: Autism Asperger Publishing Company. 
  30. ↑ 가 나 Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). 마음 이론의 선구자 : Understanding attention in others. In A. Whiten, Ed., 자연적인 마음 이론 : 진화, 발달, 생활 속 마음 읽기에 대한 시뮬레이션 (233-251). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
  31. ↑ 가 나 Leslie, A. M. (1991). 자폐증에서의 마음 이론 결여. In A. Whiten, Ed., ''자연적인 마음 이론 : 진화, 발달, 생활 속 마음 읽기에 대한 시뮬레이션 Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
  32. ↑ Hobson, R.P. (1995). 자폐증과 마음의 발달. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd.
  33. ↑ Dapretto, M., et al. (2006). 다른 사람들의 감정을 이해하기 : 자폐증 아동에서의 거울 뉴런의 미작동. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 28-30
  34. ↑ Gallagher and Frith, (2003) "Functional imaging of 'theory of mind'," Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 77-83
  35. ↑ Saxe and Kanwisher (2003), "People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in 'theory of mind'," NeuroImage 19, 1835-1842
  36. ↑ Saxe et al. (2006), "Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain," Social Neuroscience 1 (3-4), 284-298
  37. ↑ Saxe and Powell (2006), "It's the Thought That Counts: Specific Brain Regions for One Component of Theory of Mind," Psychological Science Vol. 17, No. 8, 692-699
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참고 문헌[편집]

  • Excerpts taken from: Davis, E. (2007) Mental Verbs in Nicaraguan Sign Language and the Role of Language in Theory of Mind. Undergraduate senior thesis, Barnard College, Columbia University.

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